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I. INTRODUCTION 
More than fifty years ago, in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 1 the Supreme Court upheld the right of federal courts 
of appeals to conduct en bane rehearings of prior three-judge appellate 
• J.D. 1988, Harvard Law School; Associate, Sullivan & Cromwell. I am indebted to Rich-
ard K. Milin for his invaluable assistance. This article is dedicated to the Honorable Samuel A. 
Alito, Jr. The views expressed herein are my own. 
1. 314 u.s. 326 (1941). 
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panel decisions.2 Subsequently, Congress codified the en bane proce-
dure in section 46(c) of the Judicial Code of 1948.3 
Almost from the inception of en bane review, commentators have 
criticized its use by the federal courts of appeals. Most commonly, crit-
ics have balanced the benefit of the uniformity of intra-circuit law 
achieved by en bane review against such perceived disadvantages as 
judicial inefficiency,4 diminished finality of three-judge panel decisions5 
and impairment of collegiality within a circuit.6 The critics have con-
cluded that the federal appellate judiciary would be served best by se-
verely limiting the number of en bane rehearings. They argue that the 
number of rehearings could be limited by strictly adhering to circuit 
precedent, circulating proposed three-judge panel opinions among all 
2. The term "en bane" is derived from the law french for "[i]n the bench" and refers to full 
court disposition of an appeal. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 472 (6th ed. 1990). Both Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 35 and the enabling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), use the term "in bane" 
rather than "en bane." See FED. R. APP. P. 35; 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988). See also Jon 0. New-
man, Foreword: In Bane Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50 BROOK. L. 
REv. 365, 365 n.1 (1984) (offering a possible etymology of the anglicized term "in bane"). Being 
likewise "doubtful (dubitante)," of any progress (or value) in the direction of anglicizing legal 
terminology, the term "en bane" will appear as the nomenclature for rehearing throughout this 
article due to "its prevalence in the case law and literature." Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and 
En Bane Review, 61 N.C. L. REv. 29, 29 n.l (1988). 
Technically, an en bane "hearing" refers to full court consideration by a circuit in lieu of 
determination by a three-judge panel, while a "rehearing" refers to en bane review of a case by all 
the active judges of a circuit after it has already been presented to a three-judge panel, regardless 
of whether a decision has been announced. See Note, En Bane Review in Federal Circuit Courts: 
A Reassessment, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1637, 1638 n.S (1974) (citing Lansdale v. Tyler Junior .Col-
lege, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972) (hearing en bane)). Although the terms "rehearing" and "re-
view" are interchanged in text, this article limits itself to rehearings. 
When an appellate court grants en bane review, the prior three-judge panel decision is va-
cated. See, e.g., 1ST CIR. INTER. OPER. P. X(D) ("Usually when an en bane rehearing is granted 
the previous opinion and the judgment will be vacated."); 4TH CIR. INTER. OPER. P. 40.6 ("If a 
petition for rehearing is granted, the original judgment and opinion of the Court are vacated and 
the case will be reheard before the original panel."); 6TH CIR. INTER. OPER. P. 20.10 ("The effect 
of granting a petition for rehearing en bane is to vacate the previous opinion and judgment."); 
1OTH CIR. R. 35.6 ("Unless specifically otherwise ordered, the effect of granting a rehearing en 
bane is to vacate the panel decision and judgment."). 
This article addresses only federal en bane appellate procedures, even though en bane review 
may also occur at the state appellate court level. See, e.g., David W. Louisell & Ronan E. 
Degnan, Rehearing in American Appellate Courts, 44 CAL. L. REv. 627 (1956) (broadly discuss-
ing state appellate court en bane procedures). 
3. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988). A full history of the enabling statute is set forth infra text 
accompanying notes 10-57. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 120-59. 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 160-74. 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 175-94. 
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the judges , of a circuit prior to publication, and requiring a 
supermajority vote to authorize en bane review.7 
Within the last few years, however, a new group of commentators 
has criticized en bane review based on quite different concerns. These 
commentators have suggested that the rehearing process, if not bla-
tantly political, is at least tacitly so. They have asserted that one of the 
main motivations-if not the main motivation-for many recent deci-
sions by courts of appeals having conservative majorities to grant en 
bane review is their desire to overturn the decisions of panels composed 
of more liberal colleagues in order to conform them to a more con-
servative ideology.8 Typically, these critics have also advocated reduc-
ing the number of cases granted rehearing. 
Contrary to these criticisms, and notwithstanding any ideological 
consequences, this article advocates increasing the use of en bane re-
view in order to ensure greater uniformity of circuit law. It also demon-
strates that the benefit of intra-circuit uniformity obtained through re-
hearing cases more than justifies an increased use of the procedure, and 
that critics have greatly overstated the institutional costs of en bane 
review. Finally, the article suggests that the use of en bane rehearings 
can best be increased by reducing the number of judges necessary to 
grant rehearing. 
Part II reviews the history of en bane review. Part III first asserts 
that the greater uniformity of intra-circuit law attained through en 
bane rehearings outweighs the costs involved, and advocates increasing 
the use of en bane review. Part III then demonstrates that increasing 
the use of en bane procedure, and hence majority control of circuit law, 
properly helps prevent minority decisions from binding a court's major-
ity to follow decisions with which they disagree, and also conserves ju-
dicial resources by reducing the flow of cases to the Supreme Court. 
Part IV begins by examining the criticisms of en bane review put 
forward by those commentators who have emphasized the institutional 
costs of full court rehearings, and concludes that although en bane re-
view may not dispose of cases as expeditiously as three-judge panels, 
the threat that en bane rehearings pose to efficiency, finality, collegial-
ity and judicial integrity is exaggerated. Next, Part IV suggests that 
use of en bane rehearings may be increased either by ensuring that all 
circuits in the federal judiciary interpret the number of judges neces-
7. See infra text accompanying notes 256-68. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 195-225. 
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sary to grant rehearing as a majority of the active available circuit 
judges, instead of a majority of the active eligible judges or, more radi-
cally, by amending the governing statute-and federal procedural rule to 
allow en bane rehearings even when en bane review is desired by less 
than a majority of the judges in regular active service. Part IV then 
argues that continuing vacancies on the courts of appeals mandate re-
ducing the number of judges necessary to grant en bane rehearings be-
cause these vacancies have created a de facto supermajority require-
ment of judges to authorize en bane review. Finally, Part IV evaluates 
the proposals that the critics of en bane review have advanced to im-
prove the procedure by reducing its use and concludes that these pro-
posals will not improve en bane review. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EN BANC REVIEW9 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established three separate tiers of fed-
eral courts: the Supreme Court, the district courts and the circuit 
courts-each of which was composed of two Supreme Court justices 
and one district court judge sitting together.10 In 1802, each Supreme 
Court justice was specifically assigned to a circuit and, when presiding, 
was referred to as a "circuit justice."11 The circuit court could be held 
jointly by the circuit justice of the circuit and the district judge of the 
district in which the circuit court was located, or individually by either 
the circuit justice or the district court judge.12 When sitting as circuit 
court judges, district court judges were not allowed to hear appeals 
from their own cases. 13 
As the workload of the Supreme Court grew, the burden of sitting 
as circuit justices became too great for the Supreme Court justices and, 
in 1869, one circuit court judge was appointed to each of the nine ex-
9. The description of the historical development of en bane review is derived in large part 
from the discussions set forth in Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 
1940) (en bane), affd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). See also Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. 
R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250-53 (1953); Neil D. McFeeley, En Bane Proceedings in the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 24 IDAHO L. REv. 255, 255-61 (1987); A. Lamar Alexander, Jr., Note, 
En Bane Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibili-
ties (Part 1), 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 563, 567-74 (1965) [hereinafter Alexander, Part I]; Peter 
Michael Madden, Comment, In Bane Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 
FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 402-03 (1974); Richard J. Fay, Note, En Bane Proceedings in the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 482, 482-84 (1954). 
10. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
11. See Textile Mills 1, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). 
12. ld. 
13. !d. 
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isting circuits.14 These circuit judges "soon became primarily responsi-
ble for holding the circuit courts, relieving the circuit justices of this 
work."111 
The Evarts Act of 189P6 created a "circuit court of appeals" in 
each circuit consisting of three judges, two of whom constituted a quo-
rum.17 The Evarts Act also directed the President to appoint an addi-
tional circuit judge in each circuit.18 Thus, with the exception of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to which there 
previously had been appointed one additional circuit judge/9 two cir-
cuit judges were appointed within each circuit. The Evarts Act further 
provided that, with the exception of judges who already had been ap-
pointed permanently to the courts of appeals, the three judges who con-
stituted each circuit court were to be drawn from the existing three 
categories of judges: the circuit justices, the circuit judges and the dis-
trict judges within the circuit.20 
The Judicial Code of 191221 abolished the three-judge circuit 
court system established by the Evarts Act, "thus depriving the circuit 
judges of the courts for which they had been primarily responsible 
since 1869."22 The enactment of the Judicial Code of 1912 thus left 
questions unresolved "as to whether the circuit judges had become ex 
officio judges of the circuit court of appeals, and as to whether the 
circuit court of appeals in those circuits having more than three circuit 
14. The legislation provided in pertinent part: "(t]hat for each of the nine existing judicial 
circuits there shall be appointed a circuit judge, who shall reside in his circuit, and shall possess 
the same power and jurisdiction therein as the justice of the Supreme Court allotted to the cir-
cuit." Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-48 
(1968 & Supp. 1992)). 
15. See Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 1940) (en 
bane), a.ffd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). 
16. Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-48 (1968 
& Supp. 1992)). 
17. Id. at§ 2. 
18. Id. at § 1. 
19. See Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 347, 24 Stat. 492 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-48 
(1968 & Supp. 1992)). 
20. The statute provided that if either the Supreme Court Justices or the circuit court 
judges could not attend a sitting, "one or more district judges within the circuit shall be compe-
tent to sit in the court". Evarts Act at § 3. 
21. Ch. 231, § 116,36 Stat. 1132 (1911) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-48 (1968 & 
Supp. 1992)). The statute became effective January 1, 1912. 
22. Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 1940) (en bane), 
a.ffd, 314 U.S. 326 {1941). 
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judges consisted of all the circuit judges or only three of them, and if 
the latter, which three."23 
A subsequent amendment to the Judicial Code of 191224 only par-
tially responded to these questions. Although the amendment expressly 
declared that "[t]he circuit judges in each circuit shall be judges of the 
circuit court of appeals in that circuit," it ambiguously provided that 
"it shall be the duty of each circuit judge in each circuit to sit as one of 
the judges of the circuit court of appeals in that circuit from time to 
time according to law."25 Hence, although the amendment clarified 
that the circuit judges were now assigned to the courts of appeals, the 
issue of how many circuit judges constituted any particular court of 
appeals-and at what point in time-remained unsettled. As noted 
during the Senate's consideration of the amendment, the revision 
"makes no change whatever in the existing law except to make it clear 
that the circuit judges in the various circuits of the United States shall 
constitute the circuit court of appeals."26 This question would remain 
unresolved for twenty-nine years until the Supreme Court was called 
upon to mediate an inter-circuit conflict between the Ninth and Third 
Circuits on whether a court of more than three members could sit to-
gether en bane. 
In Lang's Estate v. Commissioner,27 a three-judge panel of the 
Ninth Circuit "was faced with the situation where the decision of two 
judges of the circuit"28 in Bank of America v. Commissioner9 created 
a precedent with which "[t]he three judges sitting in [Lang's Estate] 
did not agree. "30 Instead of convening the full court to overrule the 
Bank of America decision, however, the three-judge panel in Lang's 
Estate presented a certificate to the Supreme Court "disclosing the 
23. Id. 
24. Act of January 13, 1912, ch. 9, 37 Stat. 52 (1912). The amendment was passed only 12 
days after enactment of the original Judicial Code. 
25. Id. at 53. 
· 26. 47 CONG. REC. 2736 (1912) (remarks of Sen. Sutherland). This conclusion was echoed 
by the Committee on the Judiciary to the House of Representatives. See H.R. 199, 62d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1911) (noting that the bill did no more than make "it clear that the circuit judges shall 
constitute the circuit court of appeals."). 
27. 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938). 
28. Id. at 869. 
29. 90 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1937). Judge Curtis D. Wilbur dissented from the opinion. Id. at 
983. ' 
30. Lang's Estate, 97 F.2d at 869. At the time of these decisions, the Ninth Circuit was 
composed of seven circuit court judges. There was no overlap in the judges assigned to the two 
cases, hence the majority opinion of the two judges in Bank of America "made a precedent for the 
remaining five." Id. 
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conflict between the two groups of judges and asking that it be resolved 
by that tribunal."31 The panel explained that it chose to certify the 
question rather than independently act upon it due to its belief that 
because "no more than three judges may sit in the Circuit Court of 
Appeals, there is no method of hearing or rehearing by a larger 
number."32 
By contrast, in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner 
("Textile Mills F'),33 the Third Circuit was faced with a potential rul-
ing by two judges of a three-judge panel with which the remaining two 
judges of the five member circuit, and the dissenting judge on the origi-
nal panel, disagreed.34 In response, the full court of appeals held that it 
"has the power under existing statutes to sit en banc."35 The majority 
justified the use of its power to exercise en bane review as a means of 
ensuring intra-circuit uniformity by explaining that "[a] court, as dis-
tinguished from the quorum of its members whom it may authorize to 
act in its name, cannot consist of less than the whole number of its 
members."38 The court explained that such a holding would serve only 
to "destroy the authority of the court as a court and to open the way to 
possible confusion and conflict among its personnel and in its procedure 
and decisions."37 The "possible confusion" about which the court ex-
pressed concern was that arising from situations "where two of the 
three judges sitting in a case may have a view contrary to that of the 
other three judges of the court."38 Then, the court reasoned, "it is ad-
visable that the whole court have the opportunity, if it thinks it neces-
sary, to hear and decide the question."39 
The following year, in Oughton v. National Labor Relations 
Board,"0 the Third Circuit was once more faced with a potential ruling 
by two judges of a three-judge panel with which a dissenting panel 
member and the remaining two judges of the circuit disagreed. The 
31. Id. at 870. 
32. Id. at 869. 
33. 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940), a.fl'd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). 
34. Id. at 71. 
35. Id. In so ruling, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was also upholding its own 
internal operating rule that "[t]hree judges shall sit in the court to hear all matters, except those 
which the court by special order directs to be heard by the court en bane." 3o CIR. INTER. OPER. 
R. 4 (March 1, 1940), quoted in Textile Mills Sec. Corp. I, 117 F.2d at 67 n.4. 
36. Id. at 70. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 71. 
39. Id. 
40. 118 F.2d 486 (3d Cir. 1941) (en bane). 
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court expressed concerns similar to those which had motivated it to 
grant rehearing in Textile Mills I, stating that: 
[T]he present is but another instance of the justification for the rule. Its use 
removes any possibility that the majority opinion of the court, when composed as 
ordinarily of three judges, may conflict with the majority opinion of the court 
when composed of one of the same judges and the two remaining judges of the 
court. The majority opinion of all will be binding upon all regardless of the views 
of individual judges.41 
Faced with an irreconcilable inter-circuit conflict, the Supreme 
Court in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner ("Textile 
Mills IF'),42 granted the petition for certiorari in Textile Mills I "be-
cause of the public importance" of the en bane issue and because of the 
growing "contrariety of the views" between the Third and Ninth Cir-
cuits.43 In Textile Mills II, the Court upheld the Third Circuit's inter-
pretation of the Evarts Act, ruling that the en bane rehearing proce-
dure "makes for more effective judicial administration [because] 
conflicts within a circuit will be avoided [and] finality of decision in the 
circuit courts of appeal will be promoted."'' The Court also stated that 
the benefits of uniformity and finality achieved by en bane review "are 
especially important in view of the fact that in our federal judicial sys-
41. Id. at 494-95. The Third Circuit's concern for intra-circuit uniformity of its decisions 
was described by Judge Albert Maris in a 1953 article as follows: 
The principal utility of determinations by the courts of appeals in bane is to enable the 
court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it possible for a majority of its 
judges always to control and thereby to secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions, 
while enabling the court at the same time to follow the efficient and time-saving procedure 
of having panels of three judges hear and decide the vast majority of cases as to which no 
division exists within the court. Without the procedure in bane it would be possible for 
different panels of the court to reach and apply in individual cases diametrically opposite 
conclusions upon important questions of law or practice. Not only would this confuse the 
law but it might also result in serious strains in the court when subsequently a panel of 
judges who individually disagreed with one of these decisions was called upon to decide the 
same question in a later case. 
Albert Maris, Hearing and Rehearing Cases In Bane, 14 F.R.D. 91, 96 (1953). 
42. 314 u.s. 326 (1941). 
43. Id. at 327. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or disposition of the case. 
44. I d. at 334-35. In addition, the Court held that any "ambiguity in the statute" regarding 
how many judges constituted a circuit court "is doubtless the product of inadvertence." I d. at 333. 
The Court further explained that "[although] the problem of construction is beset with difficulties, 
the conclusion that § 117 provides merely the permissible complement of judges for a circuit 
court of appeals results in greater harmony in the statutory scheme than if the language of § 117 
is taken too literally." Id. at 333-34. 
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tern these courts are the courts of last resort in the run of ordinary 
cases."·"~ 
Seven years later, the Court's decision in Textile Mills II was 
codified"6 into section 46(c) of the Judicial Code of 1948,47 which au-
thorized en bane review whenever ordered by the majority of a circuit's 
judges in regular active service.48 During the hearings on the House 
45. 314 U.S. at 335. 
46. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953) 
(declaring that the statutory authorization "is but a legislative ratification or• Textile Mills II); 
Fay, supra note 9, at 483 ("The Court's sanction of en bane action [in Textile Mills II] was 
incorporated into Title 28 ... with the express purpose of both recognizing the power to sit en 
bane and at the same time continuing the tradition of the three-judge appellate court."). Earlier 
efforts to amend the statute had been unsuccessful. See Textile Mills II, 314 U.S. at 334 n.l4 
("Beginning in 1938 the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges recommended an amend-
ment to the [then operative Judicial] Code which would enable a majority of the circuit judges in 
circuits where there were more than three to provide for a court of more than three judges.") 
(citing ATT'Y GEN. REP. 23 (1938)); ATT'Y GEN. REP. 15-16 (1939); REP. OF THE JuDICIAL CoN-
FERENCE OF SENIOR CIR. JUDGES 7 (1940). The proposed amendment provided that: 
in a circuit where there are more than three judges, the majority of the circuit judges may 
provide for a court of all the active and available circuit judges of the circuit to sit in bane 
for the hearing of particular cases, when in their opinion such action is advisable. 
Textile Mills II, 314 U.S. at 334 n.l4. This bill passed the House. H.R. 3390, S. 1053, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), quoted in Western Pac. R.R. Corp., 345 U.S. 247 at 251. 
47. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988). In whole, § 46(c) provides that: 
Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or panel of not more 
than three judges (except that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
may sit in panels of more than three judges if its rules so provide), unless a hearing or 
rehearing before the court in bane is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the 
circuit who are in regular active service. A court in bane shall consist of all circuit judges 
in regular active service, or such number of judges as may be prescribed in accordance with 
[the applicable statute] except that any senior circuit judge of the circuit shall be eligible 
to participate, at his election and upon designation and assignment pursuant to [the appli-
cable statute] and the rules of the circuit, as a member of an in bane court reviewing a 
decision of a panel of which such judge was a member. 
The rules governing appellate practice mirror this language. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) ("A ma-
jority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service may order that an appeal or other 
proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals in bane."). The federal rules, however, add 
the caveat that the granting of en bane review "is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered 
except (I) when consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its 
decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." Id. 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). The number of circuit court judges in active service is provided by 



















28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (Supp. 1992). Because of vacancies, courts often operate at less than their full 
constituency. The implications for these vacancies upon the mechanics of granting en bane review 
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and Senate bills that eventually became section 46(c), many witnesses 
testified that the purpose of amending the Judicial Code to authorize 
en bane rehearings was to "obviate the situation where ... a decision 
of two judges ... sets the precedent for the remaining judges."49 
When enacting section 46(c), Congress "left no doubt as to the 
power of the courts to hear cases en banc."110 It did, however, leave a 
critical question unresolved, for Congress made no provision as to how 
an en bane procedure might be utilized.111 Five years later, this question 
was addressed by the Supreme Court. 
In Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad 
Co.,112 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether section 46(c) of 
the Judicial Code required courts of appeals to hear cases en bane 
whenever suggested by petitioners.113 The Court held that section 46(c) 
did not address litigants, but instead granted power to the courts of 
appeals, and left the decision of whether to rehear cases to the appel-
late courts. 54 Although the Court authorized each circuit to "devise its 
are discussed infra text accompanying notes 247-55. 
49. H.R. REP. No. 1246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. {1941); HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMM. OF 
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY ON S. 1053, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), at 39-40 (state· 
ment of H. Chandler, Administrator, Judicial Conference of the United States). See also ADMIN· 
ISTRATION OF UNITED STATES COURTS: HEARINGS ON S. 1050-1054, AND H.R. 138 BEFORE THE 
SUBCOMM. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 77th Cong., 1st Sess, at 15-16 (1941) 
(statement of H. Chandler, Administrator, Judicial Conference of the United States) ("a majority 
of the court should not be bound by a decision of two members, particularly if the other members 
of the court •.. desire to have their say in regard to what they think the Jaw is." (quoting Judge 
John Biggs)); Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 252 (1953) 
("This bit of legislative history [i.e., the hearings] is significant. Congress was attempting to frame 
legislation which would empower a majority of circuit judges in any Court of Appeals to 'provide' 
for hearings en bane."). 
50. Fay, supra note 9, at 483-84. 
51. See id. 
52. 345 u.s. 247 (1953). 
53. 345 U.S. at 248. A petition for rehearing refers to a litigant's request for reargument 
before the same three-judge panel who heard the appeal. By contrast, a suggestion refers to a 
request for a rehearing by the full court. McFeeley, supra note 9, at 261 n.36. See also Newman, 
supra note 2, at 367 n.9 ("The somewhat quaint terminology of a 'suggestion' for an in bane 
rehearing appears to have originated in colloquy among members of a subcommittee of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee during hearings on a bill" that was "a predecessor of what became the Act 
of June 25, 1948 .... When Senator Danaher asked, '[o]n whose motion would the court assem-
ble en bane?,' he was told that counsel might make a 'suggestion.'" (citing HEARINGS ON S. 1053 
BEFORE A SUBCOMM. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 49 (statement of Sen. 
Danaher)); Western Pac. R.R. Corp., 345 U.S. at 252. 
54. /d. at 250. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 35(b) and (c) now provide that: 
(b) A party may suggest the appropriateness of a hearing or rehearing in bane. No re-
sponse shall be filed unless the court shall so order. The clerk shall transmit any such 
suggestion to the members of the panel and the judges of the court who are in regular 
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own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby a major-
ity may order such a hearing,"1515 the Court also held that "determina-
tions en bane are indicated whenever it seems likely that a majority of 
all the active judges would reach a different result than the panel as-
signed to hear a case or which has heard it."156 The Court explained 
that it had authorized frequent use of en bane rehearings because the 
en bane power was too "necessary and useful [a] power· ... that we 
should ever permit a court to ignore the possibilities of its use in cases 
where its use might be appropriate."157 
As the result of the Court's directive in Western Pacific Railroad 
Corp. that each circuit determine its own administrative procedures, 
the individual courts of appeals have developed their own caselaw, rules 
and internal operating procedures to govern en bane proceedings. The 
most significant of these rules and procedures are those specifying what 
constitutes a "majority" of the court for purposes of tallying en bane 
votes.158 In this respect, the administrative machinery developed in one 
circuit may often differ from that employed in another. For example, 
the internal operating rule of the United States Court of Appeals for 
active service but a vote need not be taken to determine whether the cause shall be heard 
or reheard in bane unless a judge in regular active service or a judge who was a member of 
the panel that rendered a decision sought to be reheard requests a vote on such a sugges-
tion made by a party. 
(c) If a party desires to suggest that an appeal be heard initially in bane, the suggestion 
must be made by the date on which the appellee's brief is filed. A suggestion for a rehear-
ing in bane must be made within the time prescribed by Rule 40 for filing a petition for 
rehearing, whether the suggestion is made in such petition or otherwise. The pendency of 
such a suggestion whether or not included in a petition for rehearing shall not affect the 
finality of the judgement of the court of appeals or stay the issuance of the mandate. 
FED. R. APP. P. 35(b), (c). 
55. Western Pac. R.R. Corp., 345 U.S. at 250. For contemporaneous accounts of the proce-
dures in effect at the time of the Western Pacific Railroad Corp. decision, see Fay, supra note 9, 
at 484-88. 
56. Western Pac. R.R. Corp., 345 U.S. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
57. Id. at 260. 
58. For a detailed description of the different practices within the circuits, see, e.g., Note, 
Playing With Numbers: Determining the Majority of Judges Required to Grant En Bane Sittings 
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 70 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1523-29 {1984) [hereinafter Note, 
Playing with Numbers]; Judah I. Labovitz, Note, En Bane Procedure in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, Ill U. PA. L. REv. 220, 221-27 (1962). See also Thomas J. Waters, Note, The En Bane 
Requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 46(c): What Constitutes a Majority in tFte Event of a Refusal or 
Disqualification?, ll J. LEGIS. 373 (1984) (discussing the requirements of achieving a "majority" 
of circuit court judges for the purposes of ordering full court review); Kathleen Sylvester, What 
Does a "Majority" Mean in En Bane Cases?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 16, 1984, at 6. See also infra text 
accompanying notes 241-51. 
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the Sixth Circuit, which requires an affirmative vote for rehearing by 
an "absolute majority"-i.e., a majority of all the active circuit judges 
who are eligible to vote-provides that a "majority is determined by 
calculating the majority vote of all active judges on the court, not the 
number qualified to hear the case."159 Thus, under an "absolute major-
ity" rule, judges who are either recused or unavailable count as votes 
against rehearing during en bane polls. 60 By contrast, the opposite ap-
proach has been adopted in the Seventh Circuit. There, the operating 
procedure provides that only "[a] simple majority of the voting active 
judges is required to grant a rehearing in banc."61 Under this "simple 
majority rule," only an affirmative vote by a majority of those active 
judges present is required to grant review.62 Additionally, some circuit 
internal operating procedures and rules altogether avoid defining stan-
dards for how many and what type of judges are required to vote in 
favor of rehearing in order to reach a majority of the judges in regular 
active service, and have inst_ead made this determination through 
caselaw.63 
59. See 6TH CIR. INTER. OPER. R. 20.7 (1990). 
60. See Copper & Brass Fabricators Council, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 679 F.2d 951 
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Curtis-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 599 F.2d 1259 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1022 (1980); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), 
affd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973); 5TH CIR. R. 35.6 (1990) ("For purposes of en bane voting under 28 
USC § 46(c), the term 'majority' is defined as a majority of all judges of the court in regular 
active service presently appointed to office. Judges in regular active service who are disqualified 
for any reason or who cannot participate in the decision of an en bane case nevertheless shall be 
counted as judges in regular active service."). Some courts of appeals even construe a non-re-
sponse as a vote against rehearing. See, e.g., 3D CIR. INTER. OPER. P. 9.5.4 ("An active judge who 
does not communicate with the opinionwriting judge concerning rehearing within eight (8) days 
after the date of the Clerk's letter transmitting the petition for rehearing is presumed not to desire 
in bane or that an answer be filed."). 
61. 7TH C!R. OPER. P. 5(d)(l). 
62. See, e.g., lOTH CIR. R. 35.5 ("Hearing or rehearing en bane may be ordered by a ma-
jority of the judges of this court who are in regular active service and not disqualified in the 
particular case or controversy."); 4TH CIR. R. 35(b) ("A majority, but no fewer than four, of all 
eligible, active and participating judges may grant a hearing or rehearing in bane."); 2D CiR. R. 
35 ("Neither vacancies nor disqualified judges shall be counted in determining the base on which 
'a majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service' shall be calculated, pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 46(c), for purposes of ordering a hearing or rehearing in bane."). 
63. See, e.g., 8TH CIR. INTER. OPER. P. IV D ("A rehearing en bane is granted if a majority 
of judges in regular active service vote affirmatively."). Cf. 3D CiR. INTER. OPER. R. 9.5.3 ("Pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), only active judges of this court may vote for rehearing in bane. 
Therefore, rehearing in bane shall be ordered only upon the affirmative votes of a majority of the 
judges of this court in regular active service."); Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 
(3d Cir. 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984) (denying en bane consideration de-
spite affirmative votes by five of the available eight circuit judges when the circuit was comprised 
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TABLE I 
En Bane Decisions by Circuit 
1982-1991 
1982 83 84 85 86 87 
5 10 3 5 2 4 
0 0 2 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 
5 5 3 5 5 8 
8 6 6 18 6 13 
12 11 19 13 18 10 
4 3 9 7 5 7 
7 8 6 3 7 8 
7 5 15 15 9 11 
9 4 14 6 5 7 
2 3 16 4 12 8 
10 14 8 19 18 10 
74 66 106 85 90 88 
817 
88 89 90 91 
13 12 1 7 
1 5 4 5 
2 1 1 0 
4 4 2 2 
19 11 13 9 
17 5 10 8 
6 7 4 6 
7 10 7 15 
12 14 7 15 
9 7 6 8 
13 17 19 10 
16 7 12 4 
117 98 85 89 
The data in this, and subsequent tables, are derived from the Annual Reports of the Director 
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which set forth various statistics for 
their respective federal fiscal years. 
The courts of appeals have also developed their own individual cir-
cuit cultures regarding the proper use of en bane rehearings. These cir-
cuit cultures "vary according to the size of the circuit, its workload, the 
complexity of its en bane cases, the number and perhaps the individual 
characteristics of its active judges."8' Circuit cultures also affect how 
Blaher, Appellate Procedure-Effect of Refusals on Voting for Rehearing In Bane, 30 VILL. L. 
REV. 908 (1985). 
64. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 576. See also Patricia M. Wald, Calendars, Collegi-
ality, and Other Intangibles on the Courts of Appeals, in THE fEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN 
THE 21sT CENTURY 171 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler, eds. 1989) [hereinafter Wald, 
Calendars, Collegiality] ("The character of a circuit is a delicate composite of history, judges' 
personalities, distinct kinds of regional issues and problems, and even different types of counsel 
who appear in court."). 
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frequently courts of appeals review cases en bane. For instance, be-
cause "[o]ne of the distinctive characteristics of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is the infrequency of rehear-
ings en banc,"65 it has granted the fewest rehearings of any circuit over 
















Average Number of Cases Decided 
















By contrast the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have each averaged 
about eleven en bane rehearings per year over the last decade;66 and 
65. Newman, supra note 2, at 365. See also Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Sys., Inc., 194 
F.2d 422, 429 (2d Cir. 1951) (per curiam) (Clark, J.) (stating that it is "the practice of this 
circuit never to sit in bane."); Note, The Second Circuit: Federal Judicial Administration in a 
Microcosm, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 874, 900-08 (1963) (detailing the history of the Second Circuit's 
treatment of en bane review). 
66. Table II, supra. 
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the Fifth Circuit, with an average of more than twelve annual en bane 
rehearings, has reheard more cases en bane than any other circuit.67 
Ill. INCREASING THE USE OF EN BANC REVIEW 
A. Greater Uniformity 
Beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Mills II, 
the process of en bane review has been the subject of extensive legal 
scholarship. 68 Advocates of the procedure have lauded its power to en-
courage uniformity within a circuit's jurisprudence, while detractors 
have asserted that the rehearing process diminishes judicial efficiency, 
erodes the finality of three-judge panel decisions, decreases collegiality 
among the members of a court and raises serious concerns about 
whether judges are ideologically result-oriented in reaching their deci-
sions.69 This disagreement over the benefits of en bane rehearings may 
result, as one commentator has suggested, from the fact that "no one 
model of appellate review can at the same time maximize procedural 
values such as finality, economy, consistency, impartiality, and power 
concentration. "70 
Whatever the origin of the disparity of scholars' opinions regard-
ing the desirability of en bane review, academics who have analyzed 
the en bane process typically have engaged in a cost-benefit analysis, 
weighing the benefits of the uniformity of intra-circuit law71 achieved 
67. Id. 
68. The first published treatment of en bane review was a Note in the 1942 Harvard Law 
Review that reported the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Mills II. See Note, The Power of a 
Circuit Court of Appeals to Sit En Bane, 55 HARV. L. REv. 663 (1942). Two additional Notes 
were published the year following the Supreme Court's later decision in Western Pacific Railroad 
Corp. See Note, The En Bane Procedures of the United States Courts of Appeals, 21 U. CHI. L: 
REv. 447 (1954); Fay, supra note 9. 
69. See text accompanying notes 120-225. 
70. Solimine, supra note 2, at 41 (citing Judith Resnik, Tiers, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 845-
59, 874 (1984)). 
71. Professor Arthur Hellman, in his study of the jurisprudence and appellate procedures of 
the Ninth Circuit, has posited a three-part test for determining the existence of an intra-circuit 
conflict. See Arthur Hellman, Breaking the Bane: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appel-
late Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 915, 923 and passim (1992) [hereinafter Hellman, Breaking the 
Bane]. The first part, which asks whether the holding of a new opinion reaches a different result 
from that of an existing circuit precedent, is discussed in the context of Wright v. United States 
Parole Comm'n and E.M. Diagnostic v. Local 169, discussed infra text accompanying notes 92-
99, and underlies the frustration exhibited by judges authoring opinions dissenting from the denial 
of the grant of en bane review, such as the dissent authored by the dissenters in Bartlett ex rei. 
Neuman v. Bowen, discussed infra text and accompanying notes 187-91. The second part, which 
questions whether the new case can be distinguished from the existing precedent and is therefore 
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by en bane review against such potential disadvantages as judicial inef-
ficiency, diminished finality of three-judge panel decisions and impair-
ment of collegiality within a circuit. One commentator finds ironic the 
use of cost-benefit analysis by the critics of en bane review, noting his 
surprise that "the debate over the en bane proceeding has been con-
ducted in largely utilitarian terms" even though the "commentators 
criticizing the most recent use of the en bane process for its lack of 
efficiency, are often the first to condemn the use of cost-benefit tests or 
balancing formulas when interpreting or applying various procedural 
requirements. "72 
Regardless of the irony involved, the critics of en bane review have 
concluded from their balancing test that the advantage of uniformity 
attained by rehearings is outweighed' by the institutional costs in-
curred,73 and therefore that en bane rehearings should be granted only 
in "the rarest circumstances."74 
Specifically, the critics have argued that en bane rehearings may 
not be used justifiably to ensure intra-circuit uniformity through major-
not "compelling," is discussed in the context of Part IV, infra text accompanying notes 185-92, 
which suggests that the determination of whether certain portions of a proposed opinion actually 
conflict with an existing precedent is a matter capable of being given much latitude by individual 
judges who often temper their jurisprudential rigidity with collegial considerations. The third part 
raises the issue of how, as an institutional objective, conformity to precedent balances against the 
growth of a circuit's law through what Professor Karl Llewellyn termed "trial [and] correction." 
Arthur Hellman, Breaking the Bane, supra, at 923 (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON 
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 397 {1960)). This process, which has also been termed "per-
colation" by Professors Estreicher and Sexton, see note 183 infra, does not conflict with the asser-
tions made in this article because "conformity" is limited here to those situations where, despite 
the similarity of the litigants, "it might be possible," as Judge Maris wrote, "for different panels 
of the court" to render "diametrically opposite conclusions." Maris, supra note 41. For a more 
complete discussion of the percolation theory, see Todd Tiberi, Supreme Court Denials of Certio-
rari in Conflicts Cases: Percolation or Procrastination?, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 865 (1993). These 
circumstances are different from those in which a panel is asked to apply existing precedent to a 
new factual scenario. 
72. See Solimine, supra note 2, at 40. 
73. Proceedings of the Annual Judicial Conference of the Second Judicial Circuit of the 
United States, 106 F.R.D. 103, 159 (1984) [hereinafter Second Circuit Conference] (remarks of 
Judge Irving R. Kaufman) ("In balancing the benefits and burdens of the in bane proceeding, I 
am firmly convinced that its costs are too great and its advantages too few to warrant its 
use .... "). ' 
74. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 159 (remarks of Judge Kaufman). See 
also Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 600 ("En bane rehearings therefore should be strongly 
disapproved."); Note, supra note 2: at 1654 ("It may be more profitable to reserve en bane treat-
ment for those rare conflicts that involve the integrity of the judicial process."); Steven Bennett & 
Christine Pembroke, "Mini" In Bane Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEV. ST. L. 
REv. 531, 541 (1986) ("Courts and commentators agree that conventional in bane review must be 
used sparingly .... "). 
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ity control of circuit law. The critics reach this conclusion by interpret-
ing the language of the federal rule and the enabling statute that a 
court should hear cases en bane only when it is necessary "to secure or 
maintain uniformity of its decisions" or to address "a question of ex-
ceptional importance,"715 as meaning that en bane rehearings "are sup-
posed to be limited to cases resolving intracircuit conflicts between 
panel opinions or to cases deciding questions 'of exceptional impor-
tance' "76 and not "to assure that cases are decided in the way the ma-
jority of the whole court would have decided them."77 This assertion 
that en bane review should not be used to maintain majority control 
within a circuit is unconvincing because the overwhelming importance 
of uniformity to circuit law outweighs the institutional costs incurred 
by en bane rehearings.78 
Uniformity has been described as "the most basic principle of ju-
risprudence."79 This is because "[u]niformity promotes the twin goals 
of equity and judicial integrity."80 Uniformity advances these principles 
by ensuring that similar litigants receive similar treatment and, by thus 
injecting a measure of predictability into the processes of the legal pro-
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c); FED. R. APP. P. 35. 
76. Solimine, supra note 2, at 30. See also Note, Playing With Numbers, supra note 58, at 
1510 n.32 ("The en bane device ... exists for the limited set of cases in which circuit law will be 
charted or where exceptional circumstances exist."); Labovitz, supra note 58, at 220 ("There is 
little doubt that the en bane procedure . . . was developed for the resolution of intracircuit 
conflict."). 
77. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 162 (remarks of Judge James R. Brown-
ing). See also Note, Playing With Numbers, supra note 58, at 1510 n.32 ("The en bane device 
was not created to provide an additional opportunity for review ... "). 
78. The critics' misunderstanding should not come as a surprise. One commentator has 
termed en bane review "(o]ne of the least understood proceedings in the federal judicial system.". 
McFeeley, supra note 9, at 255. Institutional policy concerns may also contribute to affirmative 
voting in favor of rehearing. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Of Voting Blocs, and Cabbages and 
Kings, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 673, 676 (1973) ("as the federal courts are taking over more and more 
of the management of the country, many courts of appeals judges are experiencing considerable 
discomfiture in being committed to far reaching policies in whose formulation they had no 
voice."); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 165 (1921) ("(T]here 
remains a percentage [of cases], not large indeed, and yet not so small as to be negligible, where a 
decision one way or the other, will count for the future, will advance or retard, sometimes much, 
sometimes little, the development of the law. These are the cases where the creative element in the 
judicial process finds its opportunity and power."). 
79. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982). 
80. Ruth B. Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The lntercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1424-25 (1987) (quoting Note, Intercircuit Conflicts and the Enforcement of Extracircuit Judg-
ments, 95 YALE L.J. 1505 (1986)). See also Patricia M. Wald, Changing Course: The Use of 
Precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 477, 488 (1986) [hereinafter 
Wa1d, Changing Course] ("the integrity of the circuit's law is [of] paramount concern."). 
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cess, providing the "consistency and moral stature essential for the 
public's confidence in the justice system."81 
When viewed in abstract, intra-circuit uniformity does not man-
date majority control of a circuit's law. Conceivably, a circuit can 
achieve uniformity of law without a majority of its judges controlling 
its decisions through strict adherence to existing precedent by all of the 
circuit members. In reality, however, judges, whether within the minor-
ity or majority of their circuits, will either avoid or conflict with ex-
isting precedent when they do not believe previous rulings correctly ap-
ply their circuit's law or aptly reflect what the law should be. As Judge 
Wald has observed, "[s]ometimes, different lines of precedent based on 
quite different premises coexist uneasily for years without actually col-
liding, and the judges will follow those precedents which they like 
best."82 Thus, until either en bane or Supreme Court review of conflict-
ing or minority three-judge panel decisions occurs, a court is left in the 
interim with a perplexing disarray of precedent, and each of these rul-
ings might be thought to "reflect[] the majority view of the active 
judges."83 The results of such circumstances are decisions that serve 
only to "confuse the law" and create serious strains in a circuit when 
the panel of judges who individually disagreed with one of these deci-
sions is later called upon to decide the same question.84 Accordingly, 
without majority control of circuit law, judicial integrity is severely 
challenged because similar litigants leave the courthouse with divergent 
results. Thus, as Judge Maris observed, en bane review of cases "en-
able[s] the court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it 
possible for a majority of its judges always to control . . . its 
decisions. "86 
In addition, given the option of revising an opinion en bane, a ma-
jority of the judges of a circuit should not be forced to abide by deci-
sions that do not reflect their understanding of the law, because this 
raises greater concerns over the integrity of the judicial process. After 
all, one reason for having multiple judges on appellate courts is that 
81. John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term Result-Oriented to Characterize Appellate 
Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187, 202 (1984). 
82. Wa1d, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 481. This is an additional reason for the 
failure of the critics' proposal to improve en bane review through strict adherence to circuit prece-
dent, as discussed infra text accompanying notes 259-261. 
83. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 586. 
84. Maris, supra note 41, at 96. 
85. /d. This language was later quoted favorably by the Supreme Court. See United States 
v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689-90 (1960). 
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their "different perceptions, premises, logic, and values . insures a 
better judgment."86 This is so even if the judges may have similar juris-
prudential ideologies. The diversity of their backgrounds and personali-
ties add to the general formula. Majority control of a circuit's decisions 
is therefore necessary both to achieve intra-circuit uniformity and to 
protect the integrity of the judicial process. 
B. Avoiding Minority Control 
Although an increase in en bane review will immediately create a 
more conservative jurisprudence reflecting the current majority of fed-
eral circuit judges, it should not be sacrificed because a temporary ide-
ological change will result.87 Increasing the use of en bane rehearings 
will enable circuits to achieve greater intra-circuit uniformity of law, 
avoiding minority control of circuit law, and preventing the confusion 
generated by conflicting lines of precedent. In addition, fewer cases will 
flow to the Supreme Court. 
It is well-settled that for the purposes of circuit precedent, every 
decision by a three-judge panel binds the entire circuit and only a court 
en bane, not another three-judge panel, can reverse the holding of a 
three-judge panel decision.88 Without en bane rehearings, a mere two-
judge minority can prevent the "policy that the active circuit judges 
shall determine to be the major doctrinal trends of the future for their 
court"89 and may use "majority status on a panel to commit the court 
86. FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE, REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPEL-
LATE BENCH 174 (1980). 
87. The extent to which the jurisprudence of any individual circuit can shift because of a 
changed constituency of the majority that controls circuit precedent is dependent on the number 
of vacant judgeships, see Table VII, infra, as well as the characteristics of individual judges (for 
example, how strictly they adhere to circuit precedent). Despite temporary-even 
strong-ideological shifts, majority control is the preferable means by which to achieve uniformity 
within a circuit. It is, moreover, quite natural for circuit law to develop through "swings" in 
ideology. See text supra accompanying notes 221-2S. 
88. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Meba Pension Trust, 9S6 F.2d 468, 471 n.3 (4th Cir. 1992) 
("under this circuit's long-standing, formal practice" a prior three-judge panel decision "is consid-
ered binding upon all panels of this court until overruled by an en bane decision of this court or a 
decision of the Supreme Court"); Dawidoff v. Minneapolis Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, SSO 
F.2d 407, 411 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977). Several courts of appeals have set forth this principle in their 
internal rules. See, e.g., 3D CIR. INTER. 0PER. P. 9.1 ("It is the tradition of this court that the 
holding of a panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent 
panel overrules the holding in a published opinion of a previous panel. Court in bane consideration 
is required to do so."). See also Newman, supra note 2, at 370 ("It is now widely agreed that in 
bane consideration is normally required to overrule existing precedent in a circuit."). 
89. United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 26S F.2d 136, ISS (2d Cir. 19S7) 
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to its own view. "90 Thus, en bane review of cases is necessary in order 
to achieve uniformity of intra-circuit law, because only en bane rehear-
ings "permit[] a court of appeals to maintain decisional uniformity."91 
The necessity of en bane review to prevent a majority of a court from 
committing its yntire circuit to a holding with which the full court 
would disagree may be seen from the dissenting opinions in two cases 
originating in different circuits. 
In Wright v. United States Parole Commission,92 the panel major-
ity relied upon a prior decision, Jones v. United States Bureau of Pris-
ons98 that apparently departed radically from circuit precedent and, ac-
cording to the dissent, abandoned the traditional abuse-of-discretion 
standard deployed by the Eighth Circuit to review parole decisions.94 
Judge Heaney's dissent asserted that not only was the Jones panel obli-
gated to follow prior circuit cases but that the panel in Wright was 
obligated to follow pre-Jones precedent.95 To do otherwise not only 
would ignore established circuit practice that "our traditional standard 
can only be overturned by the court en bane," but also would create 
confusing and conflicting lines of precedent.96 Accordingly, Judge He-
aney urged that the decision "be referred to the court en bane to decide 
(Clark, C.J. and Waterman, J., separate statement), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
363 U.S. 685 (1960). See also Madden, supra note 9, at 409 (en bane rehearings allow "all the 
active judges in the circuit [to] establish a rule of the majority for the circuit."). /d. at 402 
("Some method is needed for the majority of active judges to maintain control over the panels. 
Use of the en bane procedure can accomplish this."). 
90. Fay, supra note 9, at 491. See also Friendly, supra note 78, at 675 ("a policy by which 
two judges are empowered to commit a [larger] court to a decision which is contrary to the views 
of the other [appellate] judges and then to prevent that dissenting majority from ordering a deter-
mination of the case en bane, violates both the spirit and the letter of the statute and frustrates 
the salutary purpose of the en bane procedure."); McFeeley, supra note 9, at 263 ("Without en 
bane review, a majority of the circuit judges might be unable to have 'their say.' "). 
91. Note, Playing With Numbers, supra note 58, at 1508. See also Bennett & Pembroke, 
supra note 74, at 536 (the "structure and function of federal appellate courts mandate an en bane 
review process.''); Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat 
to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 583-84 (1969) ("en 
bane procedure is essential to a healthy law of the circuit.''); McFeeley, supra note 9, at 274 ("En 
bane consideration is essential to maintain the integrity of each circuit's decisions."); A. Lamar 
Alexander, Jr., Note, En Bane Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Insti-
tutional Responsibilities (Part II}, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 726, 744 (1965) [hereinafter Alexander, 
Part II] ("There is no workable alternative to consideration by all the active judges of the circuit 
en bane.''). 
92. 948 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1772 (1992). 
93. 903 F.2d 1178 (8th Cir. 1990). 
94. Wright, 948 F.2d at 436 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
95. Id. (citing Johnson v. Moral, 843 F.2d 846, 847 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
96. /d. 
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whether we should depart from our traditional abuse-of-discretion stan-
dard when we review parole decisions."97 , 
Similarly, in E.M. Diagnostic v. Local 169,98 a case involving col-
lective bargaining agreements, Judge Garth dissented from a majority 
holding he believed was unsupported by authority stating: 
The majority's decision in this case must inevitably lead to the confusion of the 
labor bar, unions, management, and the district court judges. Rather than foster-
ing the goals of predictability and precedential integrity in the interpretation of 
collective bargaining agreements, I fear that this decision by the majority will do 
just the opposite. It is for that reason that I not only respectfully dissent, but I 
urge consideration by the court in banc.89 
Along with early en bane review cases, the contemporary writings 
of one of the judges who codified the en bane procedure and co-wrote 
the subsequent legislative history of section 46(c), all help demonstrate 
that the "maintenance of uniformity in circuit decisions was the domi-
nant purpose underlying the creation of the en bane procedure."100 
Judge Maris who, in addition to being an influential and respected 
judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,101 
was also the Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on the 
Revision of the Judicial Code102 and one of the main forces behind the 
97. Id. at 438. 
98. 812 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1987). 
99. Id. at 104 (Garth, J., dissenting). 
100. Note, The Politics of En Bane Review, 102 HARV. L. REV. 864, 875 (1989). See also 
Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S, 247, 271 {1953) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) ("the dominant ends of [en bane review are] avoiding or resolving intra-circuit con-
flicts .... "); Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 74: at 536 ("The legislative history of the in bane 
rules and the thrust of the relevant Supreme Court cases indicate that the in bane procedure was 
originally designed to minimize conflicts in precedent."); McFeeley, supra note 9, at 261 ("The 
major reason for the existence of en bane rehearings is to ensure intra-circuit consistency .... "); 
Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 162 (remarks of Judge Browning) ("The en bane 
process ... helps achieve ... predictability."); Madden, supra note 9, at 408 ("the underlying 
purpose of the in bane procedure [is] the maintenance of control over the decisions within the 
circuit."). Cf. Daniel Egger, Court of Appeals Review of Agency Action.' The Problem of En 
Bane Ties, 100 YALE L.J. 471, 477 (1990) ("The en bane jurisdiction of the United States Courts 
of Appeals was not created deliberately as part of a coherent theory of Article III jurisprudence; 
its existence owes more to historical accident."). 
101. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 253 (1953) 
(noting Judge Maris's position of prominence); In Memory of Hon. Albert Branson Maris (1893-
1989) United States Circuit Judge (remarks of Judge John P, Fullam), 894 F.2d at CIII (Judge 
Maris "was a role model for every judge on our Court .... [h]e was the ideal of what a judge 
should be."). 
102. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 253-54 (1953) 
("At that time, Judge Maris, Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Revision of 
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creation of section 46(c).103 Judge Maris set forth his views in a 1953 
article entitled Hearing and Rehearing Cases In Banc:10"' "The princi-
pal utility of determinations by the courts of appeals in bane is to en-
able the court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it 
possible for a majority of its judges always to control and thereby to 
secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions."105 Judge Maris fur-
ther explained that by maintaining majority control of circuit law, the 
members of a circuit could prevent intra-circuit conflicts that served 
only to "confuse the law" and "also result[ed] in serious strains in the 
court when subsequently a panel of judges who individually disagreed 
with one of these decisions was called upon to decide the same question 
in a later case."106 
The legislative history of section 46(c) also amply demonstrates 
that Congress intended en bane review to be used to maintain majority 
control. The record of the hearings on the House and Senate bills that 
eventually became section 46(c), reveals that the purpose of amending 
the Judicial Code to add a section specifically providing courts of ap-
peals with statutory authorization to sit en bane was to "obviate the 
situation where . . . a decision of two judges . . . sets the precedent for 
the remaining judges."107 The testimony given at the hearings "ex-
the Judicial Code, submitted a memorandum to the House Committee on Revision of Laws ... " 
This proposal was the genesis of the present ·§ 46(c)). In addition, Judge Maris also was the 
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and a member of the 
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules. See Madden, supra note 9, at 407 n.63. 
103. See Revision of Federal Judicial Code, Preliminary Draft of H.R. 3498, 79th Cong., 
1st Sess., Committee Print II (1945) (recognizing in the reviser's Notes to the draft of§ 46(c) 
that "[s]uch subsection (c) is based on recommendations of Circuit Judge Albert B. Maris of the 
Third Circuit in his memorandum dated August 18, 1944, and submitted to the Committee on 
Revision of the Laws on August 21, 1944."); Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 
345 U.S. 247, 254 n.9, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 910 (1953). Both the Supreme Court and Congress 
took these facts into account when considering the adoption of§ 46(c): 
Judge Maris was called upon by Chief Justice Stone to serve as chairman of the Judicial 
Conference's Committee of Revision of the Laws of the United States. He served on this 
committee from 1944 until 1967 by successive appointments of Chief Justices Vinson and 
Warren. That committee collaborated with the Judiciary Committee from the House of 
Representatives and its staff, first in the monumental job of revising Title 28 of the United 
States Code and thereafter in considering continuing issues related thereto. 
In Memory of Hon. Albert Branson Maris (1893-1989) United States Circuit Judge (remarks of 
Judge Dolores K. Sloviter), 894 F.2d at C. 
104. 14 F.R.D. 91 (1953). 
105. I d. at 96. This language was later mentioned by the Supreme Court. See United States 
v. American Foreign Steamship Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 688 (1960). 
106. 14 F.R.D. at 96. 
107. H.R. REP. No. 1246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMM. Of 
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY ON S. 1053, supra note 49, at 39-40 (statement of H. 
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plain[s that] the underlying purpose of the in bane procedure 
[was] the maintenance of control over the decisions within the cir-
cuit."108 This legislative history is significant because, as the Supreme 
Court later explained in Western Pacific Railroad Corp., "Congress 
was attempting to frame legislation which would empower a majority 
of circuit judges in any Court of Appeals to 'provide' for bearings en 
bane" in order to maintain majority control of circuit law.109 
The Eighth and Third Circuit rulings in Wright and E.M. Diag-
nostic, as well as the earlier decisions in Textile Mills I and Oughton, 
along with the contemporaneous writings of Judge Maris and the legis-
lative history of section 46(c), demonstrate the importance of en bane 
review as a means of ensuring intra-circuit uniformity through majority 
control by preventing minority control of circuit law. 
C. Reducing the Supreme Court's Burden 
Increasing the use of en bane review will also assist courts of ap-
peals in their administrative task of reducing the flow of cases to the 
Supreme Court.110 This is because the only alternative to ordering en 
bane rehearing of a case that either raises an intra-circuit conflict or 
does not reflect the majority of a court's view, is to leave the matter 
unresolved in the hope that the Supreme Court will itself decide to 
determine the issue. This is an unsatisfactory result as the Supreme 
Court cannot, and should not, be required to be the arbiter of intra-
circuit conflicts. 
The Supreme Court cannot be relied upon to determine intra-cir-
cuit conflicts because the Court is functionally "no longer capable of 
providing the supervision of federal judicial law making that it once 
provided."lll Moreover, the Court bas clearly shown a disinclination to 
supervise closely the courts of appeals in this regard because it rou-
Chandler, Administrator, Judicial Conference of the United States). See also ADMINISTRATION OF 
UNITED STATES COURTS: HEARINGS ON S. 1050-1054, AND H.R. 138 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. OF 
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 49, at 15-16 (statement of H. Chandler, Ad-
ministrator, Judicial Conference of the United States) ("a majority of the court should not be 
bound by a decision of two members, particularly if the other members of the court •.• desire to 
have their say in regard to what they think the law is." (quoting Judge Biggs)). 
108. Madden, supra note 9, at 408. 
109. 345 u.s. 247, 252 (1953). 
110. See, e.g., Note, Playing With Numbers, supra note 58, at 1508 ("the en bane proce-
dure ..• serves a crucial function in the administration of federal courts."). 
Ill. Carrington, supra note 91, at 553. See also Note, Playing With Numbers, supra note 
58, at 1508 ("the Supreme Court has long ceased to perform this function"). 
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tinely "refuses to accept certification of an intra-circuit conflict on the 
grounds that it is the institutional responsibility of a court of appeals to 
resolve its own internal conflicts and uniformly develop circuit prece-
dent."112 For example, in Civil Aeronautics Board v. American Air 
Transport, Inc.,113 the Court dismissed a certificate from the D.C. Cir-
cuit, which had been "unable to agree on a disposition of the case," 
and suggested that "the Court of Appeals . . . hear this case en bane 
to resolve the deadlock indicated in the certificate and give full review 
to the entire case."114 Additionally, as the Court has noted on numer-
ous occasions, the adjudication of intra-circuit conflict through en bane 
review is primarily an appellate court task because the courts of ap-
peals "are the courts of last resort in the run of ordinary cases. " 1115 
Surprisingly, despite the Supreme Court's clear mandate that the 
courts of appeals resolve their own intra-circuit disputes, two judges of 
the Second Circuit have advocated, or at the very least condoned, the 
practice of leaving intra-circuit conflicts for the Supreme Court.116 For-
tunately, this view has been rejected by most circuit judges. For exam-
ple, in Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,117 Judge Rein-
' 
112. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 582. 
113. 344 u.s. 4 (1952). 
114. Id. at 4-5. See also United States ex rei. Robinson v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 649, 650 
(1942) (remanding the case "for further proceedings, including leave to petitioner to apply for a 
hearing before the court en bane" where it appeared that a "conflict of views" had arisen "among 
the judges of the Ninth Circuit"), cited with approval in Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western 
Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 260 n.20 (1953) (observing "that this Court has deemed the en bane 
power to be an important and useful device in the administration of justice in the courts of appeals 
is apparent from our action in" these cases). 
115. Textile Mills II, 314 U.S. 326, 334-35 (1942). 
116. See Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 158 (remarks of Judge Kaufman) 
("By subordinating personal views to the institutional needs for certainty and finality" and refus-
ing to grant en bane review of cases creating intra-circuit conflict, the "question will finally be 
settled where it ought to be settled-at the Supreme Court level."); Newman, supra note 2, at 
383 ("In the Second Circuit, we [are] ... mindful that review by higher authority is available" 
and have therefore rejected en bane reconsideration). On at least two occasions, the Supreme 
Court justified the Second Circuit's confidence and granted certiorari. See, e.g., Green v. Santa Fe 
Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1309, 1310 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 814 (1976) 
("This Court has denied en bane ... not because we believe these cases are insignificant, but 
because they are of such extraordinary importance that we are confident the Supreme Court will 
accept these matters under its certiorari jurisdiction"); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 479 F.2d 
1005, 1020 (2d Cir.) (Kaufman, Feinberg, Mansfield, Mulligan, JJ. & Friendly, C.J. concurring 
in the denial of rehearing en bane), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 908 (1973) ("I vote against en bane, 
not because I believe this case is unimportant, but because the case is of such extraordinary conse-
quence that I am confident the Supreme Court will take this matter under its certiorari 
jurisdiction."). 
117. 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Francis 
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hardt dissented from the denial of rehearing en bane mainly on his 
belief that "our circuit would be better served if we did the necessary 
job [of resolving intra-circuit conflicts] ourselves. I think that it is our 
function to correct our errors in cases of general importance . . . 
through our en bane process. " 118 In fact, some circuit judges believe 
that even inter-circuit conflicts should be reviewed en banc.119 
IV. CRITICISMS OF EN BANC REVIEW 
A. Inefficiency 
Most of the criticisms of en bane rehearings have focused on its 
alleged inefficiency.12° For example, one circuit court judge has averred 
that "the en bane proceeding is the most time-consuming and ineffi-
cient device in the appellate judiciary's repertoire."121 The en bane pro-
cedure has also been disparaged by terms that run the gamut from 
"cumbersome"122 to "unwieldy,"123 and has even been referred to as a 
"damned nuisance."124 
In claiming that en bane rehearings are inefficient, critics have as-
serted that "federal circuit courts currently labor under very heavy 
Ford, Inc., 459 U.S. 999 (1982). 
118. I d. at lOll (Reinhardt, J. dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane). See also Mad-
den, supra note 9, at 408 ("The courts of appeals have a duty to develop the federal law with 
uniformity."); Maris, supra note 41, at 96 ("The procedure in bane enables the court itself to deal 
authoritatively with problems of this nature, thus relieving the burden of the Supreme Court."); 
Carrington, supra note 91, at 583 ("the responsibility for maintaining the law of the circuit" 
belongs to the circuit judges.). 
119. See, e.g., Financial lnst. Employees Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 750 F.2d 757, 758 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (Kennedy, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); Uviedo v. Steves Sash & 
Door Co., 760 F.2d 87, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rubin, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
bane), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). 
120. See, e.g., Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 74, at 532 ("in bane proceedings .... are 
cumbersome, costly and time-consuming."); Note, supra note 2, at 1644 ("The major drawback of 
en bane review is its heavy cost in court and litigant time and expense."); Madden, supra note 9, 
at 418 ("The in bane procedure is inherently and unavoidably, time-consuming."); Carrington, 
supra note 91, at 582 ("The en bane procedure is . . . time consuming for the judiciary and 
burdensome to litigants."). 
121. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 155 (remarks of Judge Kaufman). 
122. Newman, supra note 2, at 382; Green v. Santa Fe Industries, 533 F.2d 1283, 1310 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (per curiam), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
123. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISES AND REFORM 101 (1985). 
124. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A 
STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 217 (1981). See also Sec-
ond Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 152 (remarks of Judge Lawrence W. Pierce) (referring 
to en bane consideration as "[n]ettlesome"). 
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caseloads"1215 without rehearing cases en banc.126 Because more time is 
necessary to conduct full court review of a case than simply to dispose 
of it by a three-judge panel, the critics argue that the use of en bane 
rehearings "must be strongly disfavored, and justification for them 
should approach the level of necessity."127 
Although en bane review of a case may not be as efficient as a 
three-judge panel disposition of the same case, the extent and effect of 
its "inefficiency" have been greatly exaggerated. It is certainly true 
that the workload of the federal courts is heavy and has been increas-
ing at a rapid pace. The Federal Judicial Center reported that in the 
thirty year period between 1958 and 1988, the annual number of civil 
cases terminated on the merits by the courts of appeals increased 
577% from an annual figure of 2,831 to 19,178.128 This increase in the 
125. Note, supra note 2, at 1644. See also Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 576 (observ-
ing that most federal court circuit judges are functioning at full caseload capacity); Second Cir-
cuit Conference, supra note 73, at 155 (remarks of Judge Kaufman) (noting the "the federal 
courts' staggering work load"). It is also worth noting the candid remark of one circuit court 
judge that. "American judges think of themselves as continuously besieged." Patricia M. Wald, 
Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review 
and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REv. 887 (1987) [hereinafter Wald, Some Thoughts on 
Judging]. 
126. "Each year, every judge has a heavy schedule of brief-reading, oral arguments, mo-
tions work and opinion writing in connection with cases on the regular calendar. It is an enormous 
distraction to break into this schedule and tie up the entire court to hear one case en bane." 
Bartlett ex rei. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Edwards, J., 
concurring in the denial of rehearings en bane) (emphasis in original). See also Solimine, supra 
note 2, at 30 ("As it is, federal judges and their staffs are busy enough reading briefs, hearing oral 
arguments, and writing opinions in the panel process. The en bane process requires the judiciary 
to engage in another round of written and sometimes oral argument from the litigants."). 
127. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 577. See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 476 
F.2d 806, 827 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) ("en bane review adds immeasurably 
to the expenditure of judicial time, energy and resources on the part of members of this already 
overburdened court."); Newman supra note 2, at 382 ("[t]he in bane process ... places a severe 
strain on judicial resources already considerably overburdened."); Note, supra note 2, at 1644 
("en bane hearings occupy all of the active judges of the circuit with the adjudication of a single 
case."). The overall situation has caused one circuit judge to state that "[a]s one keenly aware of 
the federal courts' staggering workload and the concomitant need for efficient judicial administra-
tion, I am particularly distressed by the increasing popularity of the in bane procedure in several 
circuits." Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 155 (remarks of Judge Kaufman). Inter-
estingly, another judge of that same circuit asserts that the heavy workload of the federal courts 
has had the opposite effect-that of dissuading rehearings. See Friendly, supra note 78, at 676 
("[The] desire for more en banes is being held in check by the tremendous pressure of work due to 
the explosion of the business of the courts of appeals."). 
128. See THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 64. This 
figure reached an all-time high last year when the United States Courts of Appeals reached a 
disposition of 39,825 cases. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 135 (1991). By comparison, the annual number of civil cases commenced in 
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federal appellate caseload has had a similar impact on the individual 
judges, despite a coinciding expansion in the number of federal circuit 
court judges.129 In 1964, Professor Wright's study of Fifth Circuit 
judges concluded that circuit judges who disposed of 80 cases per year 
were working at capacity.130 By comparison, in 1989 Judge Edwards of 
the D.C. Circuit reported that during an average full court term he 
participated in the resolution of between 17 5 and 200 cases.131 Despite 
the voluminous number of cases handled by the circuits, the collective 
courts of appeals have granted only an average of 90 full court reviews 
each year over the past decade-approximately 8 annual rehearings per 
circuit. Viewed in proportion, en bane rehearings account only for 
.524% of all cases decided by the courts of appeals during the last 
decade, just slightly more than one-half of 1%.132 This figure is materi-
ally lower than the .644% of total cases decided en bane during the 
previous decade.133 Moreover, the overall percentage of cases heard en 
U.S. District Courts "only" increased 257%, from 67,115 annual cases to 239,634. See id. at 88. 
See also Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Cur-
rent Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 385, 387 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Edwards, The Rule of a Judge] (reporting "an enormously expanding caseload, both in the 
quantity of cases heard and the mix of substantive issues"). 
129. The number of circuit judges authorized to sit on the courts of appeals is provided in 
28 U.S.C. § 44(a). 
130. See Charles A. 'Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Adminis-
tration, 42 TEX. L. REV. 949, 956-57 (1964). 
131. See Edwards, The Role of a Judge, supra note 129, at 389. But see Marc Galanter, 
The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 Mo. L. REv. 3 (1986) (dismissing concerns about the 
litigation explosion by comparing gross percentage gains with per capita increases); Marc Ga-
lanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We 
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 4 (1983). 
132. See Table III, supra. 
133. See Table IV, infra. Thus, the criticism directed by one author at Professor Solimine 
that his study suffers from shortcomings "because it does not incorporate cases decided in 1988" 
and hence "fails to include decisions from the circuits that attained Reagan-appointed majorities 
[after] 1987" is without merit. See Note, supra note 100, at 866-67. This student's criticisms of 
en bane review that "[t]he overall number of cases disposed of en bane reached an all time high" 
in 1988 while "rehearings as a percentage of the total caseload also increased relative to" 1986-
1987, are also irrelevant. See id. at 867 n.l3. · 













Totals and Percentages of 
En Bane Decisions 
1982-1991 
Total Cases Total En Bane % of Total Caseload Heard 
Decisions En Bane 
12,327 74 .600 
13,217 66 .499 
14,327 106 .739 
16,369 85 .519 
18,199 90 .494 
18,502 88 .476 
19,178 117 .610 
19,322 98 .507 
21,006 85 .405 
22,707 89 .392 
Ten Year Average 17,515 90 .524 
bane by the courts of appeals has been steadily decreasing since 
1988,134 reaching a 20 year low in 1991 of .392% of total cases termi-
nated on the merits.1311 In fact, the current yearly proportion of rehear-
ings to decided cases is only about one-fifth of the 2.5% rate of 40 
years ago.136 Thus, contrary to alarmist critiques, rehearings constitute 
an insignificant, as well as a dwindling, share of the workload of fed-
eral circuit judges, and do not add a measurable burden to the existing 
federal caseload. 137 
134. See Table IV, supra. 
135. See Table III, supra; Table IV, supra. 
136. In 1953, Judge Maris noted that "[t]he total number of cases heard or reheard in bane 
during the last annual term of the court was only six out of the total of 239 cases heard." Maris, 
supra note 41, at 92. 
137. See Solimine, supra note 2, at 42 (noting that an intolerable burden is not created by 













Ten Year Average 
EN BANC APPELLATE REVIEW 
TABLE IV 
Totals and Percentages of 
En Bane Decisions 
1972-1981 
833 
Total Cases Total En Bane % of Total Caseload Heard 
Decisions En Bane 
5,748 20 .348 
6,555 23 .350 
5,980 81 1.355 
8,596 69 .803 
8,660 63 .727 
9,113 65 .713 
8,895 64 .720 
8,994 52 .578 
10,598 65 .613 
11,980 69 .576 
8,512 57 .644 
Critics of en bane review have also claimed that it is inefficient 
due to the decisionmaking dynamics involved in full court rehearings. 
Specifically, the critics assert that: (1) a full court "lacks the benefits 
of small, flexible decision making conferences and rapid exchanges of 
draft opinions;"138 (2) larger groups of judges cannot function as effi-
ciently as smaller groups;139 and (3) "[c]ircuit judges, accustomed to 
accommodating three views in panel decision, will be less skillful in 
accommodating" the views of all their colleagues sitting en banc.140 
138. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 577. 
139. See, e.g., Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 155 (remarks of Judge Kauf-
man) ("It is axiomatic that three judges, in an intimate conference, will find the heart of a case 
more quickly than will 11."); Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 576 ("[T]hree judges is gener-
ally conceded to be the most efficient number for hearing appellate cases"); Madden, supra note 
9, at 417 ("A court comprised of three judges can decide a case in less time than a court com-
prised of seven to fifteen judges."). 
140. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 577. Thus, "[t]hree judges, in an intimate confer-
ence, will more quickly find the heart of a case than will seven or nine in a necessarily more 
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Additionally, the critics assert the process of deciding whether to grant 
en bane review is in itself time consuming because "[j]udicial time is 
expended not only in deciding the in bane appeal but also in deciding 
whether to support an in bane request initiated by a member of the 
court."141 Consequently, two Second Circuit judges have posited a di-
rect correlation between a circuit's overall efficiency in disposing of ap-
peals and the number of annual en bane rehearings granted, averring 
that "[i]t is not accidental ... that the Second Circuit, which has the 
lowest rate of rehearings in bane of all the circuits, is also the most 
efficient circuit."142 
Although more judges are involved in en bane review of a case 
than in regular panel adjudication, it does not necessarily follow that 
full court disposition is less efficient. Indeed, Professors Lewis A. Korn-
hauser and Lawrence G. Sager have shown that "given a reasonable 
understanding of what the job of judging is and under reasonable as-
sumptions about how well individual judges are likely to do it, enlarg-
ing the number of judges who sit on a court can be expected to improve 
the court's [overall] performance."143 This is because the aggregation 
of judgments of a judicially consistent group of judges will create a 
greater "consistency" in their decisions.144 
Moreover, the criticisms levelled at the perceived inefficiency of en 
bane review based on the factors involved in aggregate decisionmaking 
are overly broad and miss the point, for the number of cases reviewed 
en bane, as well as the delays that ensue/45 ultimately "vary according 
formal conference." /d. at 576. See also John J. Parker, Improving Appellate Methods, Address 
before the American Political Science Assoc. (Dec. 28, 1949) in 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1950). 
141. Newman, supra note 2, at 382. See also Solimine, supra note 2, at 38 ("The decision 
to en bane also affects how and when judicial resources will be applied to the remaining cases on 
the docket. Substantial delays can result, not only in rendering the en bane decision itself, but also 
in other cases not being heard en bane."). 
142. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 155 (remarks of Judge Kaufman); see 
also Newman, supra note 2, at 382. 
143. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 
83 (1986). 
144. See id. at 102-15 (explaining and diagramming the correlation). See also Solimine, 
supra note 2, at 49 ("While Kornhauser and Sager do not specifically address en bane decisions, 
their analysis applies usefully to that process."). 
145. The extent of delay has not been resolved. See Second Circuit Conference, supra note 
73, at 155 (remarks of Judge Kaufman) ("The interval between oral argument and in bane depo-
sition [sic] is five times as great-<m average-as that for a panel disposition."); Alexander, Part 
I, supra note 9, at 577 ("if the en bane court is substituted after some panel consideration of the 
case, the average time elapsed from panel argument to en bane judgment quadruples"); Note, 
supra note 2, at 1644 ("[c]ases initially heard en bane take approximately two-and-one-half to 
three-and-one-half times longer than cases heard and disposed of by three-judge panels."); Note, 
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to the size of the circuit, its workload, the complexity of its en bane 
cases, the number and perhaps the individual characteristics of its ac-
tive judges."146 For example, although there are approximately the 
same number of judges on the Second and D.C. Circuits/47 the judges 
of the D.C. Circuit consistently hear more cases en bane than their 
peers on the Second Circuit.148 At least two reasons relating to individ-
ual circuit character explain this discrepancy. First, while the Second 
Circuit prides itself on cordiality and a general reluctance to grant en 
bane review of three-judge panel decisions/49 the judges on the D.C. 
Circuit have been characterized as being embroiled in ideological divi-
sion and often engage in heated disputes over the granting of en bane 
review.1110 Next, whereas the Second Circuit addresses a wide variety of 
supra note 100, at 879 n.76 ("Three-judge panels can decide fifteen appeals for every case 
reheard en bane." (citing N.Y. L.J., Sept. 17, 1984, at I, col. 4)). 
146. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 576. See also Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra 
note 64, at 171 ("The character of a circuit is a delicate composite of history, judges' personali-
ties, distinct kinds of regional issues and problems, and even different types of counsel who appear 
in court."). 
147. See note 48, supra; Table VII, supra. 
148. See Table II, supra. 
149. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 2, at 384 ("Despite the occasions when each of us has 
read a panel opinion with which we profoundly disagree, we have been able, to a remarkable 
degree, to submerge our individual judicial convictions in the interest of the proper functioning of 
our court."). See also Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Systems, Inc., 194 F.2d 422, 429 (2d Cir. 
1951) (per curiam) (Clark, J., concurring) (stating that it is "the practice of this circuit never to 
sit in bane."). 
150. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Mikva, 
J., dissenting) (lamenting that the majority "achieve[s] their results by distorting the statute 
which governs this case"); Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Comm'n, 826 F.2d 1074, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1088 (1988) 
(Mikva, J., dissenting) ("The majority's conclusions are marred at every step by skewed articula-
tion of the facts and warped application of the law. The court today manages in one opinion to do 
violence to principles of preclusion, retroactivity and statutory interpretation."); Bartlett ex rei. 
Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Edwards, J., concurring in 
denial of rehearing en bane) ("Collegiality cannot exist if every dissenting judge feels obliged to 
lobby his or her colleagues to rehear the case en bane in order to vindicate that judge's position."); 
id. at 1245 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en bane) ("To demonstrate that Mar-
tin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Dept., 812 F.2d 1425 (D.C. Cir 1987), warrants en bane atten-
tion, our dissenting colleagues indulge in much 'make believe' about that case and the precedent it 
applies ... . ").See also H. SCHWARTZ. PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN 
TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION 155 (1988) ("Many cases in the District of Columbia Circuit 
were en banced because the conservative majority on the circuit led by Judge Bork was unhappy 
with the decision"). Judge Edwards has taken particular umbrage at these remarks. See Harry T. 
Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. 
L. REv. 837, 849 [hereinafter Edwards, The Judicial Function] ("I have felt damned by an in-
creasingly common image of the judiciary, and particularly of the D.C. Circuit, as a fundamen-
tally political body."). 
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conventional appeals/111 the D.C. Circuit's docket has a high concentra-
tion of administrative agency appeals1112 and is often "the first, and usu-
ally the only, Article III court that will pass on the citizen's protest 
against what he or she perceives to be an arbitrary bureaucracy."1113 
Because the D.C. Circuit may often be the only court to resolve the 
important type of disputes that appear only before it, its occasional fer-
vor relating to en bane cases, and its tendency to grant rehearing, are 
not surprising. 
The critics of en bane review have also asserted that once a re-
hearing has been granted, the logistics of en bane review, in which 
judges often travel to their circuit "seat" to hear a case/114 further de-
pletes the limited time of judges. 11111 This again exaggerates the cost of 
reviewing cases en bane. 
Although no formal internal operating procedure sets forth how 
often, or where, en bane rehearings are held, it is the informal practice 
of at least one circuit to designate a number of days each year in which 
to hear oral argument on cases granted en bane rehearing.1116 This 
practice, if not already in place in other circuits, may be easily adopted 
in order to minimize logistical inefficiencies, including judges' travel 
time, that may be caused by full court rehearings. Alternatively, be-
cause circuit judges are required by statute to attend semi-annual 
meetings of their judicial circuit/117 it is possible to schedule en bane 
review of at least some cases around the time of these conferences in 
151. The Second Circuit docket includes numerous cases arising under admiralty law and 
the Jones Act. See, e.g., Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 588 ("[H]alf of all federal admiralty 
and Jones Act claims are begun in Second Circuit trial courts ... "). 
152. One commentator notes that "[o]ne-fourth of all federal agency review cases reach the 
D.C. Circuit, far more than any other circuit." Egger, supra note 100, at 479 n.46 (1990). A. Leo 
Levin, Uniformity of Federal Law, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CEN-
TURY, supra note 64, at 138 (The D.C. Circuit "has exclusive venue on appeals in F.C.C. cases 
... and in cases growing out of a whole roster of other statutes."). 
153. Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, at 172. 
154. See 28 U.S.C § 48(a), which governs the "seating" or terms of court. 
155. See, e.g., Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 577 ("[A]ssembling the judges en bane 
from among the several states of the[ir] ... circuits may add to delay."). 
156. This practice has been a standard procedure in the Third Circuit. See Letter from 
Chief Judge Dolores K. Sloviter to Michael A. Stein (August 8, 1992) (noting that "[i]t seems to 
me self-evident that when a court votes to in bane more than one case, they would be scheduled on 
the same day") (on file with the author). 
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1988) (requiring each circuit's chief judge to "call, at least 
twice in each year and at such places as he may designate, a meeting of the judicial council of the 
circuit"). 
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order to reduce expenditure of judicial resources further. It is also pos-
sible to limit the scope of en bane rehearings to specific issues of law.168 
Finally, because approximately one in six en bane cases are de-
cided "on the briefs" without oral argument, they do not require the 
circuit judges to convene in a single place. Instead, the judges can ei-
ther conference call or exchange electronic mail, faxes or memoranda. 
In fact, many circuits do not even require oral argument in cases they 
rehear en banc.169 
B. Finality 
A second criticism of en bane rehearings is that they threaten the 
finality of three-judge panel decisions.16° Critics of en bane review ar-
gue that the grant of appellate rehearing vacating an original panel 
decision "squarely contradicts the principle that there shall be one, fi-
nal decision of the court of appeals"161 and that vacating an original 
panel decision indicates "that decisions reached by three-judge panels 
are not final but represent merely one step on an elongated appellate 
158. See, e.g., lOTH CJR. INTER. OPER. P. IX(6) ("the rehearing may be limited as to partic-
ular issues"); 9TH CJR. R. 35-3(5) ("If any issues have been isolated for specific attention, the 
order may also set forth those issues."). The Second Circuit has ruled that an appeal may be 
heard en bane with respect to a particular issue. See New York v. 11 Cornwell Co., 718 F.2d 22, 
24 (2d Cir. 1983) (en bane on cross-appeal for attorney's fees); Daye v. Att'y Gen. of New York, 
696 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 1982) (en bane on exhaustion of state remedies). 
159. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 2, at 369 ("An in bane rehearing in the Second Circuit 
does not require oral argument." (quoting S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 
1309-10 (2d Cir. 1971)). In addition, some circuits allow en bane courts to affirm a panel decision 
without opinion. See, e.g., United Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Rule 36.1. 
Rule 36.1 provides: 
When the court determines that any of the following circumstances exist: (a) judgment of 
the district court is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous; (b) the evi-
dence in support of a jury verdict is sufficient; {c) the order of an administrayive agency is 
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; (d) summary judgment, di-
rected verdict, or judgment on the pleadings is supported by the record; (e) judgment has 
been entered without an error of law; and an opinion would have no precedential value, the 
judgment or order may be affirmed or enforced without opinion. 
160. See, e.g., Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 599 ("the more serious objection to an en 
bane rehearing is its unsettling effect on finality of panel decisions."); Note, supra note 2, at 1645 
("Finality is also impaired by the availability of en bane rehearings."). But see Maris, supra note 
41, at 96 ("A decision ... made by a majority of all the judges of the court in bane obviously has 
much greater authority"). 
161. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 600. 















Percentage of En Bane Cases 
Decided on the Briefs 
1982-1991 
Total Number of Number 
En Bane Cases En on the 
Decisions Bane Decided Briefs 
After Oral 
Argument 
74 68 6 
66 56 10 
106 95 11 
85 76 9 
90 71 19 
88 73 15 
117 92 25 
98 81 18 
85 64 21 
89 75 14 
90 75 15 
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ladder."162 It has also been suggested that "[t]he possibility that the 
decision of a three-judge panel may be overruled by an en bane court 
may result in routine suggestions for an en bane [re]hearing by the 
losing party."163 
It must again be pointed out that en bane rehearings constitute 
little more than one half of one percent of all federal appellate court 
decisions.164 Thus, even if the critics are correct that rehearing a three-
162. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 157 (remarks of Judge Irving R. 
Kaufman). 
163. Note, supra note 2, at 1645. 
164. See Table III supra. 
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judge panel decision en bane goes against the principle of one final ap-
pellate decision-a vastly overstated proposition-the infrequency with 
which cases are reviewed en bane moots this point. Moreover, however 
distasteful it might be for any particular judge to have her opinion 
overruled, it is a normal facet of judicial life that on occasion, a judge's 
decision will be overturned at the next level of review.1615 
The critics have also asserted that en bane decisions erode finality 
of circuit law166 and that they tend to generate multiple opinions, often 
with dissents, 167 resulting "in ambiguously worded compromise deci-
sions accompanied by a host of concurring and dissenting opinions that 
165. For example, of the appealed district court opinions terminated on the merits by the 
courts of appeals in 1991, 11% were reversed, 79% were affirmed, 6% were dismissed, and 3% 
were remanded back to the district courts. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1991). Similarly, during the last Supreme Court term, the 
Court reversed 34.6%, vacated 47.4%, and affirmed 41% of the cases it reviewed from the courts 
of appeals. See The Statistics of the Supreme Court 1991 Term, 105 HARV. L. REV. 419 (1991). 
166. See, e.g., Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 156 (remarks of Judge Kauf-
man) (en bane cases tend to produce "either a majority opinion that was created in purposefully 
vague manner to forge a consensus within the court, or a litany of diverging opinions, injecting a 
degree of uncertainty into the law that we can well do without."); Newman, supra note 2, at 383 
(en bane decisions frequently produce "either a single majority opinion that is deliberately vague 
to key points in order to gain broad support within a court, or several opinions that express the 
differing views of groups of judges unable to join a definitive majority opinion."). It is ironic that 
Judges Kaufman and Newman would be critical of forging panel consensus, given their professed 
favor of this practice. See Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 158 (remarks of Judge 
Kaufman) (noting with approval the practice of "subordinating personal views to the institutional 
needs for certainty and finality."); Newman, supra note 2, at 384 ("Despite the occasions when 
each of us has read a panel opinion with which we profoundly disagree, we have been able, to a 
remarkable degree, to submerge our individual judicial convictions in the interest of the proper 
functioning of our court."). 
167. For example, one pair of commentators reported that during 1983 and 1984, approxi-
mately two-thirds of all en bane opinions issued by the D.C. Circuit contained a dissent. See 
Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 74, at 541. This figure is significantly higher than the overall 
dissent rate on the D.C. Circuit of 6%. See Edwards, Public Misconceptions Concerning the 
Politics of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. CoLO. L. REV. 619, 
642 (I 985); see a/so Ruth B. Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Wlzy, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 205, 
212 nn.35-36 (1985). The results of a more representative study, which examined each of the 282 
published en bane decisions rendered by the Courts of Appeals from 1985 through 1987, reported 
that only about one quarter of the published opinions contained either a concurrence or dissent. 
See Solimine, supra note 2, at 61. Professor Solimine has also suggested that the higher rate of 
dissent on en bane, as compared to panel decisions, may be inevitable. See id. at 46-47 n.92 ("On 
a panel of three judges, two will almost always agree on something even if all three reach deci-
sions by flipping coins. Accordingly, the rate of dissent on a panel is given by the rate of dissent on 
any single judge. If each judge on the panel goes along with any given colleagues 90% of the 
time, panels will be unanimous in 90% of the cases. The probability of unanimity falls as the size 
of the court increases." (citing Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 143, at 99-100 (discussing Su-
preme Court voting behavior on certiorari))). 
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give subsequent panels ammunition for distinguishing or ignoring the 
en bane decision. "168 
The assertion that multiple opinions impede finality of circuit law 
lacks merit. Regardless of the number of opinions contained in a deci-
sion, the majority's ruling controls.169 Multiple opinions are also the 
usual method by which the Supreme Court announces its rulings/70 yet 
no one would claim that as multiple opinions they make the Court's 
rulings less dispositive. 
Moreover, the "evils" of separate opinions "have been over-
stated."171 Because multiple opinions generally make individual judges' 
positions on specific issues more readily comprehensible and predict-
able, instead of eroding finality they add "considerable rationality, con-
tinuity, and legitimacy to the decision making process."172 This is espe-
cially true of dissenting opinions, because "a judge can write her 
dissent just the way she wants; she need not defer to a colleague's sen-
sibilities in order to gain a needed vote. The dissenter can thus be an 
unabashed advocate."173 Consequently, "[s]ome of our greatest juris-
r68. Note, supra note 100, at 877. 
169. Admittedly, one way en bane cases can fail to achieve uniformity is when an en bane 
panel is evenly split. Under those circumstances, the original trial court decision is reinstated, and 
the opportunity for a full appellate court to issue an opinion on the state of the law is lost. See, 
e.g., Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Federal Energy Admin., 591 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979); Bankers Life Co. v. United States, 587 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1978); 
Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Holmes, 537 
F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d. Cir. 1973); United States 
v. Walden, 458 F.2d 36 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ard. v. United States, 409 U.S. 867 
(1972); Allegheny Corp. v. Kirby, 340 F.2d 311 {2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed sub nom. Holt v. 
Allegheny Corp., 384 U.S. 28 {1966). 
170. For example, the 120 written opinions of the Court's 1991 term included 95 dissents 
and 47 concurrences. See The Statistics of the Supreme Court 1991 Term, supra note 165. Prior 
tabulations may be found in the annual November issues of that publication. 
171. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 743 (1987). 
172. Note, supra note 2, at 1655. 
173. Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 495. Dissents may also potentially influence 
a judge's peers-or even a higher court-to modify their views. For example, Judge Wald has 
described how some judges, through the use of "invitational dissents," have played a "John the 
Baptist" role in the evolution of the law. See id. at 495 & n.54 (citing ROBERT J. GLENNON, 
JEROME FRANK: ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER 181-82 {1985)). Brennan's biography of Judge Frank 
chronicles how Judge Frank's dissenting position in a Fourth Amendment issue was eventually 
vindicated by the Supreme Court. See also Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 493 n.51 
("it is not at all uncommon to see a dissenter singled out for recognition in Supreme Court opin-
ions."); Interaction and Decisionmaking on Collegial Courts: A Panel Discussion, 71 JuDICATURE 
339, 342 (Apr. 1988) ("Over 77 percent of the responses [from a comprehensive study] indicated 
that a dissenter frequently or sometimes causes the majority to alter its original opinion." (re-
marks of Professor John W. Cooley)). 
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prudence has been introduced into the law in the form of dissents and 
expressions of minority views."174 
C. Collegiality 
A third criticism of en bane rehearings is that they erode collegial-
ity among the members of a circuit. It is asserted that some judges 
regard a vote in favor of rehearing a case upon which they sat as a 
personal insult, 175 and that even the prospect of an en bane rehearing 
deals a heavy blow to the psyches of the judges constituting a three-
judge panel whose decision will become the focus of the full court's 
attention.176 Similarly, it has also been asserted that "en bane reversals 
amount to a vote of no confidence in the three-judge panel that already 
decided the appeal."177 
Despite any bruised feelings that might be engendered, en bane 
review is required by the institutional norm that judges speak and vote 
their conscience because they may not "properly sacrifice openness and 
candor for the sake of other goals."178 This is not to say that judges 
may not compromise in either writing or in joining an opinion, for it is 
undeniable that a certain amount of give-and-take is necessary in order 
174. Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, at 176. This is because "[t]he dissenting 
opinion provides insight into judicial attitudes usually not found in opinions for the court." Doug-
las 0. Linder, How Judges Judge: A Study of Disagreement on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 38 ARK. L. REV. 479, 481 (1985). See also PERCIVAL E. JACK-
SON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 15 (1969) ("It is the dissenter who dares 
to be outspoken .•.. "). 
175. See, e.g., Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 486; Alexander, Part I, supra 
note 9, at 543; Linder, supra note 174, at 487 ("[E]n bane cases more frequently generate 'bad 
feelings' than do panel cases."). But see COFFIN, supra note 86, at 174 ("In these differences and 
in the process of criticism, response, and resolution lies the virtue of the appellate process."). 
176. See, e.g., Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 157 (remarks of Judge Kauf-
man); Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, at 181 ("En banes generate the highest per-
sonal tensions on a court • . . losing an en bane is a bitter pill, since the entire court is now on 
record the other way."). 
177. Note, supra note 100, at 880. See also Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, at 
181 ("When a full court is asked to en bane a panel opinion, collegiality is at its greatest risk."). 
178. See Shapiro, supra note 171, at 731. See also Guido Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-
Tragedy, 28 CATH. U. L. REv. 427, 428-30 (1979); Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and 
the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 
169, 236·41 (1968); L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, (Parts 1-3) 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 513 & 877 
(1931); Grant Gilmore, Law, Lagic and Experience, 3 How. L.J. 26, 37-38 (1957); Karl N. Llew-
ellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. I, 17 n.29 (1934). Cf. Scott Altman, 
Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 296, 299-326 (1990) (arguing that the belief in law is partially 
se)f.fulfilling and that introspection, in addition to candor, threatens those partially self-fulfilling 
beliefs). 
842 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:805 
to reach a case disposition that is mutually agreeable to all involved.179 
Nor would anyone disagree about the important role that collegiality 
plays on a court. Certainly one of the most crucial aspects of "running 
an appellate court is maintaining an atmosphere in which judges can 
agree or disagree on substance free of personality clashes or risk of 
personal reprisal. "180 
Professor Cooley has written at length on the dynamics of appel-
late decisionmaking: 
The judge's performance of the problem solving function in a small group, for 
example at the appellate level, is a much more complex, and indeed a more so-
phisticated, type of negotiation. It requires the delicate intermeshing of the sepa-
rate problem solving functions of several persons, taking into account, at the very 
least, their personalities, their philosophies, their varying intellectual and inter-
personal abilities, and their individual biases and prejudices formed through va-
rying backgrounds and experience, both legal and nonlegal. "Appellate decision 
making," if used to describe what appellate judges primarily do, is really a mis-
nomer. It describes only part of the appellate judge's function, omitting the more 
difficult and perhaps more important behavioral aspects of the function-the cre-
ative, generative, persuasive, interpersonal tasks. Indeed, what we all have long 
believed to be "appellate decision making" is truly negotiation on a higher 
plane.181 
Judge Edwards' insights are also worth quoting at length: 
When judges respect one another and are amicable in their dealings, the deci-
sionmaking process runs smoothly: the judges' post-hearing conference focuses on 
the applicable legal precedent and record facts, with each judge openly airing 
concerns about difficulties seen with the case; there are post-conference memo-
randa and discussions between chambers which are thoughtful and helpful in 
narrowing the issues before the panel and in pursuing the correct answer to the 
case; if and when the judge who is assigned to write the case runs into unex-
pected difficulties, these matters are discussed with judicial colleagues with an 
aim to reaching a mutually satisfactory accord; and, once a draft opinion is cir-
culated, comments from judicial colleagues are given to improve the opinion, e.g., 
to correct record citations, to question applications of circuit precedent and to 
179 .. "Certainly, the art of compromise is not out of place in the halls of justice." Shapiro, 
supra note 171, at 743. See also Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 295 N.W.2d 523, 
525 (Minn. 1980) ("In the collegial decision making of an appellate court an individual judge's 
purely personal views are of less significance than they would be in a. trial court and he is subject 
to collegial restraint should he be inclined to act on them .... ") (quoting ABA STANDARDS OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS§ 3.42 (1977 draft)); 
Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 503 ("The search for consensus is a vital part of the 
dynamics of any decisionmaking body."). 
180. Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, at 178. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 807-11 (1982). 
181. John W. Cooley, How Decisions Are Made in Appellate Courts, THE JuDGES' J., 
Spring 1987, at 3. 
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offer suggestions for language changes where the draft opinion is unclear. There 
is no enmity in this process; there are no hidden political agendas at stake; there 
are no ideological leanings affecting the dialogue between the judges.182 
Nevertheless, as Professor David Shapiro has noted, "the sticking 
point can and should be an unwillingness to make or join in a state-
ment that does not represent the judge's views and that will mislead the 
opinion's readers as to what those views are."183 Under those circum-
stances, strict institutional integrity obligates individual judges to vote 
for rehearing of three-judge panel decisions that do not represent their 
understanding of the law.184 
Ultimately, the determination of whether certain portions of a pro-
posed opinion adequately "represent the judge's views"185 receives 
much latitude from the individual judges themselves, as judges often 
disagree over whether "mere" disagreement is sufficient cause to over-
turn a panel decision en banc.188 A striking example of how individual 
judges may disagree over whether en bane is necessary in any particu-
lar case is provided by Bartlett ex rei. Neuman v. Bowen.187 In Bart-
lett, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on its own motion recon-
sidered appellees' suggestions for en bane rehearing of a panel decision 
that consolidated three appeals; vacated its previous orders granting en 
bane rehearing of the consolidated panel decision, and reinstated the 
182. Edwards, The Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 858. 
183. Shapiro, supra note 171, at 743. See also SAMUEL EsTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, 
REDEFJNING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE 57 (1986) ("Disuniformity in the law becomes intoler-
able when litigants are ... unable readily to adjust their affairs to the law's divergent com-
mands."); Easterbrook, supra note 180, at 807-08 ("The assertion that it is 'beneficial' to write 
skeletal opinions in order to obtain more agreement is dubious."); Interaction and Decisionmaking 
on Collegial Courts: A Panel Discussion (remarks of Justice Seymour Simon), supra note 173, at 
340 ("If you get a lot of dissenting opinions, so be it; I think that's the way the law grows and if 
collegiality means a great effort toward unanimity, who needs it."). 
184. Note, Playing with Numbers, supra note 58, at 1510 n.32 ("[T]he en bane mechanism 
is always available to judges who merely disagree with a circuit panel's decision."). 
185. Shapiro, supra note 171, at 743. 
186. Compare Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 312 F.2d 893, 894 (2d Cir. 1963) 
(en bane) ("Mere disagreement, or likelihood of disagreement, with the panel decision, has not 
generally been regarded as sufficient reason for a further hearing ... ") with United States v. 
Singleton, 763 F.2d 1432, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Edwards J., concurring in denial of rehearing 
en bane despite his "find[ing] it difficult to subscribe to the panel's decision"). Moreover, one pair 
of commentators finds disuniformity in the federal court system expected, tolerable, and some-
times even beneficial, because it allows issues to "percolate" and undergo a thorough analysis in 
lower courts before reaching the appellate or Supreme Court level. See EsTREICHER & SEXTON, 
supra note 183, at 50-52. 
187. 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane). 
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original panel decisions.188 Although the judges concurring and dissent-
ing to the denial of rehearing en bane agreed that no single opinion 
could represent every judge's view / 89 they vehemently disagreed 
whether the original three-judge panel decision was a "sweeping and 
revolutionary decision"190 or one which "merely follows well-estab-
lished Supreme Court precedent."191 
As a practical matter, jurisprudential rigidity is tempered by colle-
gial considerations, and "the most effective antidote" against unwar-
ranted en bane reconsideration of a case still remains "the very human 
desire of judges to coexist in peace. "192 
Finally, it is worth noting that some judges believe rehearings in-
duce collegiality. For example, Judge James R. Browning of the Ninth 
Circuit has reported that members of his circuit "thoroughly enjoy par-
ticipating in en bane proceedings" and in fact view en bane gatherings 
as an "opportunity for interchange that leads to improved personal 
communication and to the development of the attitude of trust and re-
spect that is essential to judicial deliberation."193 In fact, 
188. Id. at 1240-42. 
189. See id. at 1244 (Edwards, J., concurring in denial of rehearings en bane) ("Obviously, 
no judge agrees with all of the decisions handed down in the circuit, nor would every judge write a 
particular opinion in the same fashion."); id. at 1253 (Starr, J., dissenting from vacatur of orders) 
("Whether a particular exercise of judicial judgment is sound or not is itself, I recognize, pecu-
liarly a matter of judgment. There is apt to be no incontestably 'right' answer if the issue is truly 
one entrusted to the exercise of a court's judgment. What is right and meet will depend in large 
measure upon one's conception of what is appropriate and proper under the circumstances."). 
190. 824 F.2d at 1248 (Bork, Starr, Buckley, Williams and D.H. Ginsburg, J.J., dissenting 
from the vacatur of orders and from denial of rehearings en bane). The polemics were sufficiently 
heated to gain national attention. See Karpay, En Bane Furor, Liberal Fury, AM. LAW., May/ 
June 1988, 10 (special supplement) (noting "the commitment of many Reagan appellate appoin-
tees to leave their ideological fingerprints on as many key decisions as possible."). Ironically for 
those critics who assert that many judges vote in favor·of en bane because of ideological consider-
ations, see infra, the "swing" vote which ultimately vacated the previous orders in favor of en 
bane rehearings, was cast by a Reagan appointee. See Bartlett ex rei. Neuman, 824 F.2d at 1246 
(Silberman, J., concurring in denial of rehearings en bane) ("I am the one who, upon reflection, 
has reconsidered his views."). 
191. ld. at 1242-43 (Edwards, J., concurring in denial of rehearings en bane). 
192. Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 488. These considerations often result in 
the balancing of otherwise competing values. See Interaction and Decisionmaking on Collegial 
Courts: A Panel Discussion, supra note 173, at 342 (remarks of Professor Geoffrey Miller) ("I 
think that judges and justices want it both ways. At times most of them have enormous collegial-
ity and stick to the view that this is the law and we want unanimity. On the other hand, when it 
suits their purposes or interests, then it is their responsibility to disagree."). 
193. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 163 (remarks of Judge Browning). Other 
judges share Judge Browning's view. See, e.g., Maris, supra note 41, at 96-97 ("The Circuit 
Judges of the Third Circuit think that [the en bane] procedure has been very helpful in maintain-
ing the very high esprit de corps which they enjoy."). The differing attitudes towards en bane 
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"[i]nstitutional harmony may be advanced by permitting judges to par-
ticipate in important cases about which they have strong feelings."194 
D. Ideology 
Finally, a recent group of critics has asserted that the Reagan and 
Bush appointees, who comprise a majority of the present federal appel-
late judiciary/915 are actively turning the jurisprudence of their circuits 
to the right.196 This second group of critics argue that one way the new 
conservative majorities achieve their ideological goals is by granting re-
hearings in order to overrule fundamental constitutional decisions ren-
dered earlier by more liberally-minded panels.197 For example, one 
commentator, reiterating criticisms made in other publications, asserts 
that the changed political composition of the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth 
Circuits has yielded an increased use of en bane review to override es-
tablished circuit caselaw/98 thereby compromising "important judicial 
values. "199 
rehearings may ultimately be due to the fact that "[c]ollegiality is not a matter of numbers." 
Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 159 (remarks of Judge Browning). 
194. Note, supra note 2, at 1649 (emphasis added). 
195. As of October 1992, 92 of 145-a1most two-thirds of all federal circuit judges-had 
been appointed by either President Reagan or Bush. 
196. See, e.g., Stephen Wermiel, Full-Court Review of Panel Rulings Becomes Tool Often 
Used by Reagan Judges Aiming to Mold Law, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1988, at 70, col. I (declar-
ing that en bane review "has become a weapon for some Reagan appointees seeking to steer 
federal courts in a more conservative direction."); ScHWARTZ. supra note 150 ("Many cases in 
the District of Columbia Circuit were en banced because the conservative majority on the circuit 
led by Judge Bork was unhappy with the decision, and there are indications that this is happening 
in other circuits as well."). But see Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1179, 1180 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Ripple, J., dissenting from granting hearing en bane) ("Certainly, no member of the court be-
lieves, I hope, than an en bane proceeding may be used as a vehicle to permit judges to further 
their own ideological predilections."). 
I 97. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 2, at 32 (concluding "that over one-half of the cases" 
[reviewed by en bane from 1980 to 1987] should not have been decided by the full court."); Note, 
supra note 100, at 874 (criticizing "the emergence of a trend towards the use of en bane review to 
advance ideological and partisan goals."); Noreen Marcus, Rule of Law (and Economics), AM. 
LAWYER, June 1988, at 39 (special supplement) ("The conservative majority is using en banes to 
say to the liberals, 'You'd better get in line. We're running the show now.'"); Ann Woolner, Tug 
of War Gets Intense, AM. LAWYER, June 1988, at 34 (special supplement) (dichotomous partisan 
appointment "has led to a deeply divided court replete with spats among the judges and bitter 
battles over en bane rehearings that often turn the tables on panel decisions and even on 
precedent.''). 
198. See Note, supra note 100, at 874-75. As of October 1992, 9 of the 14 active Sixth 
Circuit Court judges, 7 of the 10 active Sixth Circuit judges, and 8 of the 10 active Eighth Circuit 
Court judges had been appointed by either President Reagan or Bush. 
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There are several flaws in these assertions. First, the critics' asser-
tions of conspiratorial jurisprudence fail when examined in light of the 
contrary evidence that has been assembled. For example, a thorough 
study of the en bane voting patterns of circuit judges by Professor 
Michael Solimine concluded that "[t]he data do not support the charge 
that the Reagan-appointed judges are using the en bane procedure as 
an ideological tool. "200 In addition, the assertions made just do not 
200. Solimine, supra note 2, at 62. See also Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, Note, 
All the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 766, 791 (1987) (concluding that "Reagan judges do not appear to be 
more conservative in their judicial decision-making than their Republican colleagues."); Joan M. 
Cheever & Edward Frost, A Reagan Star Shines Bright on the 'Hot Bench', AM. LAW., June 
I 988, at 17 (special supplement) ("The idea that appointees of any administration, including 
[Reagan's], have significantly changed the day-to-day decision making of the courts is vastly over-
stated." (quoting Judge Jon 0. Newman)); Freiwald, The Mission: Stock Bench, AM. LAW., 
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stand up to numerical scrutiny, for they cannot account for why the 
Second Circuit, whose twelve members include eight Reagan/Bush ap-
pointees,201 consistently has among the fewest annual en bane 
rehearings. 202 
Moreover, these criticisms are based upon the postulate that 
judges vote in blocs that can be directly correlated to party affilia-
tion.203 Consequently, both an individual judge's position, and by exten-
sion those of her similarly appointed colleagues, can be predicted in 
advance. The validity of such a jurisprudential litmus test is at best 
debatable. 204 
Certainly, presidents have historically chosen federal court judges 
whom they believe will uphold their own party's general philosophical 
outlook.205 It is, however, incorrect to aver that on any given issue all 
May f June 1988, 7 (special supplement) ("Reagan judges rarely vote in blocs"); Susan D. Rice, 
Earl Warren Would Blush, AM. LAW., MayfJune 1988, 46 (special supplement) ("In 95 percent 
of the cases, it doesn't make a difference whether you're a Republican, a Democrat, or a radical. 
You arrive at the same result." (quoting Judge Browning)). 
201. As of this writing, the Second Circuit had one vacancy. For a list of the authorized 
number of appellate judges per circuit, see note 48, supra. 
202. See Table I, supra. 
203. One of the first individuals to study judges' voting patterns was Professor Sheldon 
Goldman, a political scientist who reviewed the voting behavior of federal appellate court judges 
and concluded that "an element of justice-by-lottery is inherent in the three member panel de-
vice." Sheldon Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968 
Wis. L. REV. 461, 481. This thesis was in turn sharply criticized by Judge Henry J. Friendly, who 
cautioned that the reader of Goldman's article "should not draw from these figures, relating to a 
small fraction of the cases decided by the courts of appeals, a conviction that judges regularly vote 
on ideological lines." See Friendly, supra note 78, at 677. Subsequent studies have buttressed 
Judge Friendly's position. See, e.g., J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEAL IN THE FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 
160-88 ( 1981) (study of appellate judge voting found that judges tend to vote along lines of duty 
rather than along lines of political preconceptions); Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges' Attrib-
utes and Case Characteristics: An Alternative Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decision-
making, 71 JUDICATURE 277 (1988) (identifying correlation in voting patterns by prestige of edu-
cation, political and prior judicial experience, and specific judicial viewpoints.); Edwards, The 
Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 854 ("There is simply no significant statistical support for 
[the] underlying ... premise that judicial results invariably flow from judges' politics, rather 
than from legal principles."). 
204. Judge Edwards has lamented the prevalence of this premise as well. See Edwards, The 
Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 849-50 ("This vision of a politicized judiciary, in which 
cases are decided on ideological grounds and judges defined by their partisan affiliations, seems to 
grow more popular each year. By now, it is almost taken for granted by much of the media, and 
doubtlessly accepted as truth by significant portions of the bar and the public as well."). 
205. See, e.g., Justin J. Green, Parameters of Dissensus on Shifting Small Groups, in JuDI-
CIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS 139, 150 (Sheldon Goldman & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1986) 
("[The] party of the appointing president would be the best variable to adopt as a surrogate 
measure of political ideology."); Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, at 178 
848 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:805 
judges appointed by the same political party, or even for that matter by 
the same president, will always reach the same conclusion, even if that 
is often the result.206 Such a premise is based upon faulty methodologi-
cal assumptions for it ignores the unique nature of judges in both their 
individual capacity and as collective bodies. For example, in the Bart-
lett decision discussed above, Judge Laurence H. Silberman, an other-
wise rather conservative Reagan-appointee, reconsidered his views and 
voted alongside his democratic-appointed colleagues on reconsideration 
of the court's previous orders granting rehearings.207 Indeed, the char-
acterization of judges voting along strictly ideological lines, has been 
ardently rejected by Judge Edwards, one of the "victims" of the con-
servatives' alleged tactics, who asserts that "members of the federal 
judiciary strive, most often successfully, to decide cases in accord with 
the law rather than with their own ideological or partisan prefer-
ences."208 Judge Edwards has also noted that the more judges are de-
picted as engaging in political or result-oriented decisionmaking, the 
greater the likelihood that these accusations will be believed regardless 
of their intrinsic validity.209 
Second, even if judges were inclined to vote along party affiliation 
lines, it is by no means clear that the decision to vote in favor of re-
hearing a case is motivated by political, rather than jurisprudential, 
concerns.210 The same circuit judge who avowed that there are circuit 
("[P]residents overwhelmingly choose judges with sympathetic philosophies .... "). For an exam-
ination of the possible congruence of political party affiliation and voting patterns, see generally 
Richard A. Brisbin, Federal Courts and the Changing Role of American Political Parties, 5 N. 
ILL. U. L. REv. 31 (1984); John C. Danforth, The Federal Judiciary and Partisan Politics, 4 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 199 (1984); Goldman, supra note 203, at 481. 
206. See, e.g., Edwards, The Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 854 ("It is absolutely 
false, however, that judges' politics routinely determine the outcomes of cases."). 
207. Bartlett ex rei. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Silberman, 
J., concurring in the denial of rehearings en bane). 
208. Edwards, The Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 838. 
209. See Edwards, The Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 838-39 (asserting that 
"[e]ven if judges are able to resist the temptation to conform to the false perception, continued 
assessments of judicial performance in political terms will promote a 'new reality,' for most people 
will come to believe that the judicial function is nothing more than a political enterprise."). 
210. This postulate has become the foundation of the critical legal studies movement. See, 
e.g., Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 563, 571-72 
(1983) (castigating the notion that legal doctrine and principled decisionmaking may be distin-
guished from "open-ended ideology."). Interestingly, many of the judges who are presumably the 
subject of this scholarship, disagree with its conclusion. See, e.g., Edwards, The Judicial Function, 
supra note 150, at 838 ("[M]embers of the federal judiciary strive, most often successfully, to 
decide cases in accord with the law rather than with their own ideological or partisan prefer-
ences."); Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge's Response to the Critical Legal Studies 
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judges "who believe it is their duty to seek in bane reconsideration of 
every opinion that has decided a significant issue contrary to their judi-
cial views,"211 acknowledged at the same time that "[t]here is fre-
quently room for honest difference of opinion about whether a panel 
decision is really at variance with a precedent of the circuit or merely 
looking the other way on distinguishable facts."212 
Most importantly, even if it could be shown that certain judges 
decide cases based upon "political considerations,"213 such action 
hardly "compromises ... important judicial values."214 This is because 
"political considerations" themselves account for a good many of these 
critics' assertions, and are often the result of intense scrutiny by anti-
conservative commentators to the voting patterns of judges recently ap-
pointed by Republican administrations.215 Thus, as one commentator 
has suggested, perhaps someone "should remind the critics who charge 
the Reagan appointees with political use of the en bane process of the 
danger of throwing stones from glass houses. "216 
Further, these criticisms are based upon unfair assumptions. 
Under their scheme, the critics of en bane review consider liberal deci-
sions rendered by panels composed of a majority of Democrat-ap-
pointed judges neutral, while the reversals of these decisions by circuits 
composed of a majority of Republican-appointed judges are labelled 
Movement, 37 J. LEGAL Eouc. 307, 307-08 {1987) ("My conclusions are that legal doctrine is a 
real force, judges follow it, and they decide all but a small fraction of the cases that come before 
them in accordance with what they perceive to be the controlling legal rules."). 
211. Newman, supra note 2, at 384. See also Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 
483 ("[T]here are judges ... who, as a point of honor, seek to en bane every case they lost at the 
panel stage."). 
212. Newman, supra note 2, at 370-71. See also Solimine, supra note 2, at 40 n.53 ("Rea-
sonable judges can disagree over whether different panel decisions in fact conflict." (citing Klein v. 
Stop-N-Go, 824 F.2d 453, 453 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (accusing 
the panel majority with creating an intracircuit conflict))) and Bartlett ex rei. Neuman v. Bowen, 
824 F.2d 1240, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Bork, Buckley, D. Ginsburg, Starr & Williams, JJ., dis-
senting from denial of en bane rehearings) (asserting that since there was a conflict in the panel 
decisions, the case ought to be heard en bane.); Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 491 
("Judges honestly differ about whether the facts distinguishing one case from another, despite 
common principles, are material enough to justify or even dictate a different result."). 
213. See, e.g., Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 479 ("[I]n the high visibility 
cases, involving controversial social or 'moral' issues, our differences in judicial philosophy, on the 
proper role of the courts in a democratic society, do emerge front and center."). 
214. Note, supra note 100, at 866. 
215. "[T]he recent shift in composition of the courts, has focused attention on the purported 
motivations and strategic behavior of the appellate judges deciding cases en bane." Solimine, 
supra note 2, at 29 n.5. 
216. ld. at 47-48. 
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ideologicaJ.217 As one circuit judge has noted, "[s]o entrenched is the 
political vision of the circuit court that commentators can find partisan 
overtones in even quite neutral court activities."218 There are, however, 
other less extreme, and in fact politically neutral methods, for depicting 
the conduct of federal court judges.219 For example, Professor Richard 
Fallon has characterized the traditionally opposite approaches to the 
assertion of power by federal courts over state courts as an ideological 
struggle between the advocates of "Federalist" and "Nationalist" theo-
ries,220 without passing judgment on the validity of the jurisprudence of 
either group. 
Finally, even if the jurisprudential outlook of the collective circuits 
has become more conservative, this does not mean that institutional 
values have been compromised, for it is normal that "gradually and 
subtly, the jurisprudence of a court reflects the politics of the na-
tion."221 Because appointments to the federal judiciary have been in the 
217. One D.C. Circuit Court judge offers the following example: 
a decision not to reconsider a panel ruling allowing Eastern Airlines to furlough thousands 
of employees is described as a win for "the Reagan appointees" and a defeat for "the 
liberals"; the same story, in an effort at a novel brand of nonpartisanship, is quick to point 
out that "the conservatives were the losers last October," when "[flour Reagan appointees 
lost a bid to rehear a decision" involving attorney's fees. 
Edwards, The Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 850, citing Eastern Case Stirs D.C. Circuit 
Discord, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 16, 1989, at 12. The literature is replete with other examples. See, 
e.g., Note, supra note 100, at 880 ("[I]deological use of en bane review ... introduces the haz-
ard of result-oriented manipulation at another level and is worth excising when no strong reasons 
justify its use."); Bernard Weinraub, Reagan Says He'll Use Vacancies to Discourage Judicial 
Activism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1985, at AI (reporting that Harvard Law Professor Laurence H. 
Tribe believes that Reagan has been "stacking . . . the Federal judiciary" with individuals "hand-
picked to serve. a concrete social and political agenda."); Tom Wicker, Splendid for Starters, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 6, 1986, at A31 (referring to Reagan appointees as "rigid ideologues"). 
218. Edwards, The Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 852. 
219. See Simonett, supra note 81, at 207 ("There is a large variety of labels for judges: 
liberal or conservative, innovator or traditionalist, strict or loose constructionist, pragmatist or 
idealist, activist or nonactivist. But labels are little more than that .... "). . 
220. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv. 
1141, 1143-46 {1988). Under the Federalist model "states emerge as sovereign entities against 
which federal courts should exercise only limited powers, and state courts, which are presumed to 
be as fair and competent as federal courts, stand as the ultimate guarantors of constitutional 
rights." Id. at 1143-44 (citations omitted). By contrast, the Nationalist model posits that "state 
sovereignty interests must yield to the vindication of federal rights and that, because state courts 
should not be presumed as competent as federal courts to enforce constitutional liberties, rights to 
have federal issues adjudicated in a federal forum should be construed broadly." Id. at 1145 
(citations omitted). According to Fallon, Federalist jurists include Chief Justices Rehnquist and 
Burger, Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, and Powell, while Nationalist jurists include JustiCes Bren-
nan and Marshall and Judge Gibbons. Id. at 1146. 
221. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging, supra note 125, at 894. 
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hands of Republican administrations for all but four of the last twenty 
years, it is to be expected that new appointees would eventually gain 
majority status within most of the circuits and begin to assert their 
particular jurisprudential views. It is natural that "[c]ircuit court ma-
jorities come and go with the administration in power"222 and therefore 
it is to be expected that after a period of time in the other direction, 
the judicial "pendulum swings back toward a more stable-if differ-
ent-body of circuit precedent."223 As discussed above,224 it is proper 
that a circuit should follow the understanding of the law held by the 
majority of its members regardless of ideological consequences. Finally, 
it points to the political bent of the critics themselves that none voiced 
concern when "[a]s a result of the addition of the new judges during 
President Carter's administration," the Ninth Circuit, which had been 
"a rather conservative court of appeals was converted into a rather lib-
eral one."2215 
E. Proposals to Improve En Bane Review 
The use of en bane rehearings may be increased by ensuring that 
all circuits in the federal judiciary interpret the number of judges nec-
essary to grant rehearing as a majority of the active available circuit 
court judges instead of a majority of the active eligible judges.226 
To grant rehearing, both section 46(c) of the Judicial Code and 
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require an affirm-
222. Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, 'at 176. 
223. Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 490. 
224. See supra text accompanying notes 87-99. 
225. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 161 (remarks of Judge James R. 
Browning). 
226. This suggestion has met with the approval of several circuit court judges. See, e.g., 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 677 and S.678 Before the Subcomm. 
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 162, 205 (1979) (statement of Judge Friendly); Newman, supra note 2, at 368 ("the base 
for determining whether a majority of the active judges favors an in bane should be the number of 
active judges eligible to participate in the case at hand."). See also Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 
725 F.2d 910, 929 (3d Cir. 1983) (reh'g en bane denied) (Adams, J., statement sur petition for 
rehearing) (musing that in light of the fact that affirmative votes by five of the available eight 
circuit judges for en bane rehearing was insufficient to grant the petition because the circuit was 
comprised of ten judges, "our Court's in bane voting rule must appear quite unfair."), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1042 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(reh'g in bane denied), a.ffd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (Timbers, dissenting from denial of rehearing) 
("I think it is most unfortunate that en bane reconsideration of such a substantial question of 
unusual importance is being denied despite" a majority of the eligible active circuit judges voting 
in favor of rehearing); Blaher, supra note 63 (discussing Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh). 
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ative vote by a majority of the active circuit judges of the circuit who 
are in regular active service.227 Neither the enabling statute nor the 
rule, however, sets forth which judges are in "regular active service." 
In United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp.,228 the Su-
preme Court declined an opportunity to interpret what Congress meant 
by "regular active service" and instead held narrowly that "under ex-
isting legislation a retired circuit judge is without power to participate 
in an en bane Court of Appeals determination."229 Subsequently, Con-
gress modified the "existing legislation" to allow a senior judge to par-
ticipate "as a member of an in bane court reviewing a decision of a 
panel of which such judge was a member."230 Although this amend-
ment to section 46(c) explained that senior judges are not included 
among those judges who are in "regular active service," it has re-
mained unclear exactly which judges are included within the meaning 
of this term. 
One commentator has interpreted the phrase "regular active ser-
vice" to mean those judges who have been "appointed to the circuit 
pursuant to section 44(a) of the Judicial Code who ha[ve] not retired 
by the time of the en bane decision."231 Such a definition, however, 
begs the question of whether judges who are recused or otherwise un-
available-due to illness or personal circumstances-are considered to 
be in "regular active service." 
The ambiguity of the term "regular active service" in combination 
with the Supreme Court's ruling "that Congress left it to the courts of 
appeals to decide how they would exercise their discretionary power to 
227. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) and FED. R. APP. P. 35, the full texts of which are set forth 
supra note 51. 
228. 363 u.s. 658 (1960). 
229. !d. at 691. 
230. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). The legislation was the result of a bill approved by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, which suggested adding the following sentence to Section 46(c): 
"A circuit judge of the circuit who has retired from regular active service shall also be competent 
to sit as a judge of the court in bane in the rehearing of a case or controversy if he sat in the court 
or division at the original hearing thereof." ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 9-10 (1959) (quoted in United States v. American-
Foreign Steamship Corp., 363 U.S. at 690 n.7). This legislation was pending at the time of the 
Court's adjudication of the American-Foreign Steamship case. !d. at 690. The effect of the legis-
lation is well-settled: "Only the active judges of the circuit may participate in an en bane rehear-
ing except that a retired judge of the circuit may also sit if he participated in the original panel 
hearing." Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 738. · 
231. Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 738. 
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sit en banc"232 has led courts of appeals to promulgate inconsistent in-
ternal operating rules and procedures relating to their en bane powers. 
For example, the internal operating rule of the Sixth Circuit that 
requires an affirmative vote for rehearing by an "absolute major-
ity"-i.e., a majority of all the active circuit judges who are eligible to 
vote-provides that a "majority is determined by calculating the ma-
jority vote of all active judges on the court, not the number qualified to 
hear the case."233 Thus, under an "absolute majority" rule, judges who 
are either recused or unavailable, count as votes against rehearing dur-
ing en bane polls.234 By contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has adopted the opposite approach; its operating procedure pro-
vides that only "[a] simple majority of the voting active judges is re-
quired to grant a rehearing in banc."235 Under this "simple majority 
rule," only an affirmative vote by a majority of those active judges pre-
sent is required to grant review.236 Additionally, some circuits have al-
together avoided defining standards in their internal operating proce-
dures and rules for how many and what type of judges are required to 
vote in favor of rehearing in order to reach a majority of the judges in 
232. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 269 (1953) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). 
233. See 6TH CIR. INTER. OPER. R. 20.7 (199Q). 
234. See Copper & Brass Fabricators Council v. Department of Treasury, No. 81-2091 
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 1982) (unpublished order denying rehearing in bane); Curtis-Wright Corp. v. 
General Elec. Co., 599 F.2d 1259 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1022 (1980); Zahn v. 
International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), ajfd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973); 5TH CIR. R. 
35.6 ("For purposes of en bane voting under 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), the term 'majority' is defined as a 
majority of all judges of the court in regular active service presently appointed to office. Judges in 
regular active service who are disqualified for any reason or who cannot participate in the decision 
of an en bane case nevertheless shall be counted as judges in regular active service."). Some 
circuits even construe a non-response as a vote against rehearing. See, e.g., 3o CIR. INTER. 0PER. 
P. 9.5.4 (1992) ("An active judge who does not communicate with the opinionwriting judge con-
cerning rehearing within eight (8) days after the date of the Clerk's letter transmitting the peti-
tion for rehearing is presumed not to desire in bane or than an answer be filed."). 
235. 7TH CIR. 0PER. P. 5(d)(l) (1992). 
236. See, e.g., 10TH CIR. R. 35.5 (1990) ("Hearing or rehearing en bane may be ordered by 
a majority of the judges of this court who are in regular active service and not disqualified in the 
particular case or controversy."); 4TH CIR. R. 35(b) (1990) ("A majority, but no fewer than four, 
of all eligible, active and participating judges may grant a hearing or rehearing in bane."); but see 
2o CIR. R. 35 (1990) ("Neither vacancies nor disqualified judges shall be counted in determining 
the base on which 'a majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service' shall be 
calculated, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), for purposes of ordering a hearing or rehearing in 
bane."). 
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regular active service,237 and have instead made this determination 
through caselaw.238 
Reducing the number of judges necessary to grant rehearing may 
be accomplished by using the discretionary power granted to the courts 
of appeals. In contrast to the circumstances faced by a three-judge 
panel of the Ninth Circuit in Lang's Estate,239 which had no formal 
"method of hearing or rehearing by a larger number,"240 the Supreme 
Court in Western Pacific Railroad Corp., authorized each circuit to 
"devise its own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby 
a majority may order such a hearing."241 In bestowing this power upon 
the courts of appeals,242 the Court made clear its intention to allow 
future cir'cuit majorities to amend their internal operating procedures 
and rules to serve their own needs by stating that courts "should adopt 
a practice whereby the majority of the full bench may determine 
whether there will be hearings or rehearings en bane . . . so that a 
majority always retains the power to revise the procedure."2" 3 The 
Court also directed the circuits to "adopt such means as will enable its 
full membership to determine whether the court's administration of the 
power is achieving the full purpose of the statute so that the court will 
better be able to change its en bane procedure, should it deem change 
advisable."244 Thus, the individual circuits may promulgate rules and 
internal operating procedures that would allow modification in the way 
en bane votes are tallied. 
A second method to increase the use of en bane rehearings is to 
amend section 46(c) and the federal procedural rule to allow en bane 
rehearings even when they are desired by less than a majority of the 
judges in regular active service. The exact number required for grant-
237. See, e.g., 8TH CIR. INTER. OPER. P. IV D (1990) ("a rehearing en bane is granted if a 
- majority of judges in regular active service vote affirmatively."). 
238. Compare 3D CIR. INTER. OPER. R. 9.5.3 (1992) ("Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), only 
active judges of this court may vote for rehearing in bane. Therefore, rehearing in bane shall be 
ordered only upon the affirmative votes of a majority of the judges of this court in regular active 
service.") with Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 
105 S. Ct. 266 (1984) (denying en bane consideration despite affirmative votes by five of the 
available eight circuit judges when the circuit was comprised of ten judges). 
239. 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938). 
240. !d. at 869. 
241. 417 u.s. 622, 625 {1974). 
242. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to pre-
.scribe general rules of practice and procedure [for the] courts of appeals." !d. 
243. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 261 (1953) (em-
phasis added). 
244. !d. (emphasis added). 
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ing rehearing would vary according to the determination by an individ-
ual circuit as to "whether the court's administration of the power is 
achieving the full purpose of the statute."2411 Although this second sug-
gested method for improving en bane review is more radical than sim-
ply modifying the way courts interpret how many judges are required 
to grant en bane rehearing, and may more drastically reduce the num-
ber of judges required, the decision to vote en bane will still remain one 
of "the most serious non-merits determinations an appellate court can 
make"246 and will continue to receive thoughtful consideration. In addi-
tion, it must be remembered that a decision to rehear a case notes only 
its significance to a circuit and is not a final determination of its merits. 
Regardless of which suggestion for increasing the use of en bane 
rehearings is adopted, it is imperative that the number of judges neces-
sary to grant rehearing be reduced. Continuing vacancies on the courts 
of appeals247 have severely affected the mechanics of granting en bane 
review. As discussed above, most courts require an affirmative vote by a 
majority of a circuit's eligible judges in regular active service in order 
to authorize en bane rehearings.248 In other words, more than one-half 
of a court's members must normally vote in favor of sitting en bane. 
Continuing vacancies have, however, effectively required courts of ap-
peals to obtain a supermajority of affirmative votes to grant en bane 
review. Although a comprehensive table is set forth, two examples help 
illustrate this point. In the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 
which is authorized to have twelve members, seven active circuit judges 
must affirmatively vote in favor of rehearing a case in order for that 
case to be reviewed en banc.249 Because of unfilled judgeships, the Elev-
enth Circuit presently has only nine sitting active judges.2110 Thus, in-
stead of seven of twelve judges, or 58% of the court's affirmative vote, 
seven of nine, or 78% are required.2111 Along even more dramatic lines, 
245. Id. 
246. Bartlett ex rei. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane) 
(Edwards, J., concurring in denial of rehearings en bane). 
247. See Table VII, infra. 
248. See supra text accompanying notes 227-38. 
249. See Table VII, supra. 
250. See id. 
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TABLE VII 
Number and Percentage of Judges 
Required to Grant En Bane Rehearings 
Number of Number of 
Judges Judges 
Number of Required Number of Required 
Authorized to Achieve Actual to Achieve 
Judges Majority Percentage Judges Majority 
I2 7/I2 58% II 7/11 
6 4/6 66% 4 4/4 
13 7/I3 54% 12 7/12 
I4 8/I4 57% 11 8/11 
15 8/I5 53% 13 8/I3 
I7 9/I7 53% 13 9/I3 
16 9/I6 56% 14 9/I4 
11 6/11 55% 10 6/10 
I1 6/11 55% IO 6/10 
28 I5/28 54% 28 I5/28 
I2 7/I2 58% 11 7/11 















the First Circuit, which is authorized to have six active judges in regu-
lar service, 2~2 normally requires four of the six, or 66 % of its members 
to be disposed toward rehearing.2~3 Because of two vacancies that leave 
the circuit with only four judges, conceivably every judge must vote in 
favor of en bane review for rehearing to be granted.2~4 Moreover, the 
overall percentage of circuit judges required to vote en bane has 
252. See id. 
253. See id. 
254. See id. Even more peculiarly, assuming that there was some method by which the First 
Circuit could presently review a case en bane without senior circuit judge inclusion, and the two 
judges who made up the majority on the original three-judge panel did not change their 
votes-then the best result would be an even split and the decision of the district court would be 
affirmed. For a more detailed account of the effects of a split en bane court, see discussion set 
forth supra note I69. 
1993] EN BANC APPELLATE REVIEW 857 
swelled from 56% to 67%.21111 These increases make it imperative that 
the number of judges required to grant en bane review be reduced. 
The critics of en bane review have themselves made three propos-
als to improve the en bane procedure, each of which would reduce the 
number of rehearings granted. These proposals are self-disciplined ad-
herence to circuit precedent,2118 circulation of opinions among all the 
judges of a circuit prior to publication,2117 and requiring a supermajority 
of active circuit judges to grant en bane review.2118 The perceived bene-
fits of these proposals to limit, and hence improve, en bane review, are 
more illusory than real. 
Advocates of judicial self-discipline explain that direct conflicts in 
caselaw seldom arise when judges strictly follow the law of their cir-
cuits.2119 As can be expected, most courts of appeals already require 
their members to adhere to circuit precedent.280 There is therefore no 
255. See Table VII supra. 
256. See, e.g., Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 743 ("One alternative [to en bane 
consideration] is to attempt to eliminate intra-circuit conflict by absolute adherence to circuit 
precedent"); Note, supra note 2, at 1655 ("[T]he success of any efforts to limit the use of the en 
bane procedure must rely on the reasoned self-restraint of the circuit judges."). 
257. Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 727. See also Newman, supra note 2, at 381 
("Some circuits routinely circulate all proposed panel opinions to the full court, thereby affording 
each active judge an opportunity to request an in bane poll before the panel opinion is issued."). 
Provision for the circulation of suggestions to panel members was made in a 1979 amendment to 
Rule 35. See FED. R. APP. P. 35, NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES ("Provi-
sion is made for circulating the suggestions to members of the panel despite the fact that senior 
judges on the panel would not be entitled to vote on whether a suggestion will be granted."). 
Judge Newman has pointed out that when opinions are circulated, there often transpires an "in 
bane polling" in which judges will send each other memoranda on the merits (or lack thereof) for 
en bancing a case. Newman, supra note 2, at 379-80. 
258. See, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at 1655 (it may be useful to require a larger degree of 
consensus among circuit judges before en bane review will be ordered . . . . Congress could re-
quire an affirmative vote of two thirds."); Note, supra note 100, at 866 ("[R]equiring a 
supermajority of the judges sitting in a circuit to vote to rehear a case offers the most promising 
alternative to the current practice."). See also Carrington, supra note 91, at 585-96 (advocating 
supernumerary judges who would not sit en bane). Not all judges agree. See, e.g., Newman, supra 
note 2, at 368 ("[T]he base for determining whether a majority of the active judges favors an in 
bane should be the number of active judges eligible to participate in the case at hand."). 
259. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 2, at 382 ("[T]he need to 'secure or maintain uniform-
ity of ... decisions' will rarely arise if a court disciplines itself to follow its precedents faith-
fully.") (footnote omitted). See also Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 
247, 270 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[T]he most constructive way of resolving conflicts 
is to avoid them"); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 143, at 83 ("If each judge on a court acts 
consistently from case to case, so too will the court that they constitute."). 
260. See, e.g., 3D CIR. INTER. OPER. P. 9.1 (1992) ("It is the traditional of this court that 
the holding of a panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent 
panel overrules the holding in a published opinion of a previous panel. Court in bane consideration 
is required to do so."). See also Bartlett ex rei. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (D.C. 
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reason to believe that judges who presently ignore or evade this require-
ment would now yield to it because the incentives for following circuit 
precedent would not chang~. In addition, strict adherence to circuit 
precedent may, as has been demonstrated above,261 prove detrimental 
to circuit law in situations where the adhered-to precedent reflects a 
minority of a court's view of the law. 
Similarly, if a conflict is about to arise between existing circuit law 
and a panel's proposed decision in a case, it is asserted by the critics 
that this conflict can often be eliminated or at least minimized through 
the dissemination and discussion of the pending opinion because this "is 
clearly the most effective intramural method of discovering possible en 
bane indications before panel decision is announced."262 Judge Wald 
reports that under these circumstance a mini en bane device known as 
the "Irons Footnote," after Irons v. Diamond,263 has become popular in 
the D.C. Circuit: 
Because only a full en bane court can overrule a panel opinion and because some 
obsolete or unpopular precedents are just not important enough to elevate to full 
scale briefing and en bane argument treatment, a panel may draft an opinion 
overruling a prior precedent and circulate it to the full court, highlighting what it 
is doing. If the court agrees, it will then be noted in the opinion that the former 
precedent is no longer valid.2s. 
Again, there is no reason to believe that judges who had previously 
persisted in contra-majority holdings will now relent in their beliefs 
simply because they are required to review a circulated opinion first. 
Moreover, judges may be reluctant to persuade their colleagues to 
amend their decisions because of "a combination of the notion that the 
Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Edwards, J., concurring in denial of rehearings en bane) (Circuit court 
judges "are both intelligent enough to know the law and conscientious enough to abide by their 
oath to uphold it."). 
261. See supra text accompanying notes 87-99. 
262. Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 727. See also Friendly, supra note 78, at 676 
("Consideration of an en bane at this stage is less traumatic than later when the full court is being 
asked to alter a published opinion of a panel, and probably less time consuming as well."); New-
man, supra note 2, at 380 ("A noteworthy aspect of the unsuccessful in bane polls is that on 
occasion the request for a poll and the indication of some support for an in bane rehearing has 
been followed by modification of the panel opinion."). 
263. 670 F.2d 265, 268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
264. Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 486 n.30 (citing Telecommunications Re-
search and Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 75 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 496 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 
F.2d 1, 16 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied; 105 S. Ct. 1843 (1985); Landrigan v. F.B.I., 722 
F.2d 840, 845 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
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panel is the 'court' and an unwillingness to meddle in other judges' 
opinions unless invited,"265 or because some jurists hold to the percep-
tion that "consistent attention to decisions of other panels takes a great 
deal of time from a busy judge's own panel duties."266 
Finally, the critics argue that requiring a supermajority of judges 
to vote in favor of rehearing ensures that only cases that truly warrant 
en bane scrutiny will be passed upon by the full court.267 As stated 
above, however, due to vacancies on the circuits, which now effectively 
require affirmative voting by a supermajority of a court's members, this 
proposal would make it nearly impossible for courts to grant en bane 
review. As one commentator has stated: 
[A] policy by which two judges are empowered to commit a [larger] court to a 
decision which is contrary to the views of the other [appellate] judges and then 
to prevent that dissenting majority from ordering a determination of the case en 
bane, violates both the spirit and the letter of the statute and frustrates the salu-
tary purpose of the en bane procedure.288 
Two uncommon proposals also bear noting. Justice Walter Schae-
fer of the Illinois Supreme Court has suggested that "every circuit fol-
low the first panel decision anywhere in the country, unless an en bane 
decides to the contrary, in which event that en bane will control until 
the Supreme Court holds otherwise."269 Professor Leo Levin has cor-
rectly pointed out that this proposal would "put an intolerable burden 
on the U.S. Supreme Court, because you run the risk of achieving uni-
formity at the price of a less than optimal result, unless and until the 
Supreme Court decides to intervene."270 A second proposal is to in-
crease the use of "mini" en bane reviews. Under this scheme, a panel 
will circulate a proposed, yet unpublished decision that it believes will 
conflict with circuit precedent prior to publication.271 Once more it 
265. See, e.g., Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 728. But see LLEWELLYN, supra note 
71, at 317 (the reluctance to meddle in other judges' opinions is a "regrettable" condition in a 
court which sits in divisions.). 
266. Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 728. 
267. See, e.g., Note, supra note 100, at 866 ("[R]equiring a supermajority of the judges 
sitting in a circuit to vote to rehear a case offers the most promising alternative to the current 
practice."). See also Carrington, supra note 91, at 585-96 (advocating supernumerary judges who 
would not sit en bane). 
268. Fay, supra note 9, at 491. 
269. Levin, supra note 152, at 139. 
270. Id. 
271. See generally Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 74, at 544-64. 
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seems unlikely that judges convinced enough of their position to go 
against established precedent would later amend their views.272 
Thus, the proposals offered by the critics of en bane review to re-
duce the use of en bane rehearings, if adopted, would not improve the 
procedure, because the same judges who have previously failed to fol-
low circuit rules are now bound by more rules. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has advocated increasing the use of en bane review in 
order to achieve greater uniformity of circuit law. In so doing, it has 
demonstrated how the intra-circuit uniformity achieved through en 
bane rehearings justifies an increased use of en bane review by helping 
to avoid minority control of circuit law and by reducing the flow of 
cases to the Supreme Court. In responding to the critics of the proce-
dure, this article has shown that the underlying institutional costs that 
commentators impute to en bane review are greatly overstated. For al-
though en bane rehearings do not dispose of cases as quickly as three-
judge panel decisions, their infrequent use mitigates against its in-
creased inefficiency. In addition, en bane rehearings have not been 
demonstrated to erode finality of decisions, abrade the harmony of cir-
cuits or arise as the result of decision-oriented politics. Finally, this ar-
ticle has shown that continuing court of appeals vacancies, which cre-
ate the need for a supermajority vote for en bane consideration, make 
increased use of en bane rehearings a practical necessity because other-
wise, decisions that do not reflect the views of a majority of a circuit's 
judges will stand as precedent, and perhaps create intra-circuit conflicts 
that can only be resolved by serendipitous Supreme Court review. It 
has suggested that the use of en bane review can best be increased by 
reducing the number of judges necessary to grant rehearing from a ma-
jority of eligible circuit judges to a majority of those available. 
272. But see id. at 544-64. Accord Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 601, offering the 
alternative of panel rehearing ("When a panel decision requires rehearing, it often may be done 
more appropriately by the panel than by the court en bane."). 
